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NOTE
WILL THE RULE OF LAW END?* CHALLENGING GRANTS
OF AMNESTY FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS OF A PRIOR REGIME:
CHILE'S NEW MODEL
ROBERTJ. QUINN**
INTRODUCTION
From 1973 until now, we have lived always counting how many were
dead and how many were detained. If a moment came when there
were fewer dead and fewer detained, we always said, "Ah, the situa-
tion is better for human rights." But that was a deeply erroneous
statement. The problem is not one of numbers. The problem is who
decides who lives and who dies, who is in jail and who is free.'
On September 11, 1973, a military junta led by General Augusto Pi-
nochet Ugarte shattered Chile's long history of civilian rule by over-
throwing the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende.
In the subsequent years of military rule, the Junta systematically vio-
lated the fundamental human rights of thousands of Chilean citizens. In
1978, in order to shield its agents responsible for the worst of the viola-
tions, the Junta issued an amnesty decree. Chilean Decree Law No.
21912 is a blanket amnesty3 law covering acts committed during the first
* Responding to the possibility of prosecutions of military officers for their
involvement in the human rights violations of the past, General Pinochet, former leader
of the military Junta and still Commander-in-Chief, stated "No one is going to touch my
people. The day they do, the rule of law will come to an end." Americas Watch,
Human Rights and the "Politics of Agreements:" Chile During President Aylwin's First
Year 48 (1991). This Note suggests that, rather than threaten it, the dismantling of the
amnesty decree would strengthen the rule of law, both with regard to the crimes of the
past, and as a deterrent to future violations.
** I thank the Fordham-MCI International Legal Fellowship for funding the re-
search for this Note. I thank Carmen Rohland, Doris and Marcello Montealegre,
Hernfin Montealegre Klenner, and the many individuals in Chile and the United States
who assisted me with interviews and guidance. I also thank Kenneth Anderson, Manuel
DelValle, and Jos6 Miguel Vivanco for their advice on sections of the text.
1. Claudia Drewifus, Freedom is the Best Revenge; Interview with Chilean human
rights activist Roberto Garreton Merino, Nation, Aug. 13, 1990, at 162 (remarks of Ro-
berto Garreton, former national legal director of the Vicarib de Solidaridad, one of
Chile's leading human rights organizations, and current head of the Office of Human
Rights in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
2. Decree Law No. 2191 (Apr. 18, 1978), published in Diario Oficial, No. 30,042
(Apr. 19, 1978). A decree law is a norm "dictated by a de facto government-one not
constitutionally established which has assumed legislative branch powers." Report of
the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 74 note j (Phillip F. Berryman,
trans., 1993) [hereinafter Report] (translation of the official government report: Informe
de la Comisidn Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliacidn (also known as the Informe Rettig
[Rettig Report])).
Diario Oficial is "Chile's journal in which all presidential decrees and laws must be
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five years of military rule, from September 11, 1973, the date of the mili-
tary coup, through March 10, 1978.' During that period, agents of the
Chilean government killed over 2115 civilians.' Thousands more had
property taken or destroyed, were detained, beaten and tortured, or
forced into exile. The State has punished no one.6
published, and therefore made public, within five working days following processing. It
is published daily." Id. at 13 note a. But cf infra note 122 (asserting that publication is
not necessary once a law has been properly ratified).
3. Amnesty is "the abolition and forgetfulness of the offense." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 83 (6th ed. 1990). When amnesty is granted "both the crime and punishment are
abrogated." Id.
Amnesty and pardon "are of a different character and have different purposes." Id. at
1113. Pardon is "lain executive action that mitigates or sets aside punishment for a
crime." Id. Amnesty, therefore, "overlooks [the] offense; [pardon] remits punishment.
[Amnesty] is usually addressed to crimes against the sovereignty of the state, to political
offenses, forgiveness being deemed more expedient for the public welfare than prosecu-
tion and punishment. [Pardon] condones infractions of the peace of the state." Id.
This Note does not question the power of a state to grant amnesty for crimes against
its sovereignty, such as treason, sedition, and rebellion. This Note suggests, however,
that states may not properly grant amnesty for grave violations of individual human
rights committed by the state or state agents. The state is restricted in this manner
because the power to amnesty "those who have infracted its sovereignty by rebellion or
otherwise flows from the role of the State as the victim." Robert K. Goldman, Amnesty
Laws, International Law and the American Convention on Human Rights, 6 Law Group
Docket (Int'l Hum. Rts. L. Group), Summer 1989, at 3. While the state may properly
issue pardons after investigation and identification of offending parties, only the victims
themselves may forgive or otherwise eliminate the wrongfulness of acts in violation of
their individual rights. See id.
4. The vast majority of the human rights violations committed under the Junta
occurred from September 1973 through 1978, the first five years of military rule. This
Note, therefore, does not examine the violations that occurred during the 12 years of
military rule following the passage of the March 1978 amnesty decree and ending with
the election of a civilian government in March 1990. See generally Report, supra note 2,
at 635-775 (discussing acts committed between August 1977 and March 1990).
5. See Report, supra note 2, at 899. A total of 3877 confirmed or unresolved cases
of death or disappearance were officially recorded between September 1973 and March
1990. See id. This total represents roughly .04% of Chile's total population at the time.
The same percentage in the United States today would equal roughly 108,000 lives lost.
6. In addition to the amnesty decree, the military regime ensured itself impunity by
expanding the jurisdiction and use of military courts in cases involving civilians arising
from events before and after the 1978 amnesty decree. See generally Watson W. Gal-
leher, State Repression's Facade of Legality: The Military Courts in Chile, 2 Temp. Int'l
& Comp. L.J. 183, 188-96 (1988) (describing expanded use of military courts in govern-
ment repression); Thomas A. O'Keefe, The Use of the Military Justice System to Try
Civilians in Chile, N.Y. St. B.J., Nov. 1989, at 43, 46-47. Proposals to restrict the juris-
diction of these courts are progressing in the Chilean legislature. See Robert G. Vaughn,
Proposals for Judicial Reform in Chile, 16 Fordham Int'l L.J. 577, 579-87, 590-93 (1992-
93).
Article 4 of the amnesty decree provides the only exception to this total impunity.
Article 4 specifically exempts from protection those implicated in the 1976 assassination
of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and his American aide, Ronni Mof-
fit. See infra note 47. On November 12, 1993, Chilean Supreme Court Judge Adolfo
Banados convicted two high ranking military officers in the murders. See Don Podesta,
2 Generals Convicted In Killing of Letelier; Chileans to be Jailed for Washington Murder,
Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1993, at A19. Judge Banados sentenced retired general Manuel
Contreras, former head of the secret police for the military regime, to seven years in
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The Junta ceded power in March of 1990. The victims of offenses
covered by the Junta's amnesty decree are now challenging its validity
under both domestic and international law. The outcome of these chal-
lenges is significant not only for Chile, but for the many nations with
similar histories who look to Chile for an acceptable model for address-
ing the crimes of a prior regime.7
This Note asserts that the amnesty decree violates Chile's interna-
tional treaty obligations to provide victims with effective remedies, ac-
cess to hearings, and compensation.8 At the same time, however, this
Note suggests that the international community should not altogether
reject the Chilean model. The measured approach of President Aylwin's
administration, seeking "the whole truth and justice as far as possible,"9
while not satisfying suggested standards of mitigation, has demonstrated
practical merit, particularly in the areas of recognition of state involve-
ment and compensation. This Note suggests that if the new administra-
tion of Eduardo Frei"° continues to address the problem of the past
violations, advancing toward an eventual dismantling of the blanket am-
prison, and active-duty brigadier general Pedro Espinoza to six years. See id. They
remain free pending appeals to the full Supreme Court. See Katherine Ellison, Pinochet
Henchman Vows He'll Avoid Jail, Toronto Star, Jan. 2, 1994, at E8; Alan Tomlinson,
Chile's People and Their New Government Want Justice (National Public Radio broad-
cast, Weekend Edition, Transcript # 1050-13, Dec. 19, 1993).
A subsequent case, however, indicates the continued strength of the impunity crafted
by the amnesty decree. After the Supreme Court reversed an earlier denial and ap-
pointed an investigating justice, that justice, denying the government's claim that the
amnesty decree cannot apply in cases which affect Chile's foreign relations, ruled against
prosecution and held that the amnesty decree applied in the case of Carmen Soria, a
U.N. official and Spanish citizen abducted, tortured and killed in 1976 by state agents.
See Chile Court Agrees to Probe Diplomat's 1976 Death, Reuter Library Rep., Dec. 9,
1993 (BC Cycle), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File; William R. Long,
Prosecution Barred in U.N. Official's Death; Chile: Military Intelligence Agents Will Not
be Tried in Murder of Spaniard. Family's Lawyer Plans an Appeal. But Court is Unlikely
to Act Further, L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1994, at A6. The impunity, therefore, has yet to be
broken.
Nevertheless, recent events offer some hope. Chile's House of Deputies (Cdmara de
Diputados), for example, largely in response to the Soria case, called on the Army to
form a commission to purge itself of officers involved in the abuses of the past. See Chile:
Purging the Military, Latin Am. Wkly. Rep., Jan. 20, 1994, at 24, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Papers File.
7. For a discussion of the problem of transition governments and human rights
violations of a prior regime, see infra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 145-59 and accompanying text.
9. David Pilling, Military Whitewash?; Chileans Worry Army Will Be Cleared of
'Disappeared' Deaths, Gazette (Montreal), Aug. 15, 1993, at B4 (quoting Aylwin).
10. On December 11, 1993, Christian-Democratic Party (DC) member Eduardo
Frei, son of former-President Eduardo Frei (1964-70), was elected president with 58% of
the national vote. He replaces fellow Christian-Democrat Patricio Aylwin, who will
complete his four-year term in March 1994. See Chile's President-Elect Eduardo Frei
Names Cabinet, Reuters: Money Rep., Dec. 26, 1993 (BC cycle), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Currnt File. Under the terms of the transfer from military to civilian
rule, as the first president of the transition, Aylwin was ineligible to run for a second
term.
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nesty decree, it could demonstrate an acceptable model for other emerg-
ing democracies: a model of gradual compliance with international legal
obligations that also satisfies concerns for domestic stability.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with a brief comment
on the problem of transition governments and past violations of human
rights. It then sets out background information on events in Chile and
the amnesty law. Part II examines Chile's treaty obligations, particu-
larly those under the American Convention on Human Rights (the
"American Convention"), and explores the present challenge to the am-
nesty law before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the
"Commission")."1 Part III concludes that although Chile cannot escape
these treaty obligations, it may mitigate its non-compliance by continu-
ing recent measures at investigation and compensation. Ultimately,
however, to achieve minimal compliance with international obligations,
Chile must remove the blanket of impunity 2 created by the amnesty
law.
I. BACKGROUND
Arising out of nearly seventeen years of military rule, marked by sys-
tematic violations of human rights and the subsequent impunity of the
amnesty decree, Chile may offer lessons for other nations struggling to
address the problems created by prior repressive regimes.
A. The Problem of Past Violations
The Junta's policy of systematic violation of human rights was not an
experience unique to Chile. Similar policies were employed throughout
Latin America.' 3 In Argentina in the 1970s, successive military juntas
11. Part of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Commission is
charged with addressing complaints filed under the provisions of the American Conven-
tion. See infra note 132.
12. Impunity is defined as "exemption or protection from penalty or punishment."
Black's Law Dictionary 758 (6th ed. 1990). In this Note, impunity refers to the security
from identification, prosecution and punishment for grave violations of human rights
currently enjoyed by state agents under grants of amnesty, generally, and Chile's Decree
Law No. 2191, in particular. See Report, supra note 2, at 124 (listing four factors al-
lowing perpetrators of human rights violations to act with impunity: difficulty "weigh-
ing proof against government agents," the courts' "acceptance of official versions of
events," use of the amnesty law "to halt investigations of the events it covers," and
"[f]ailure of the Supreme Court to exercise its oversight over war tribunals").
13. Neither the official state policy of violations nor the derivative problem of a sub-
sequent government's handling of those crimes has been unique to Latin America. See
International Comm'n of Jurists, Military Regimes in Latin America, 17 Review 13
(1976); Susan Benesch, Salvadoran President: Amnesty Is Answer, St. Petersburg Times,
Mar. 19, 1993, at IA (discussing settling accounts for past violations in, among others,
Germany, Greece, the Philippines, Mali, and the Central African Republic).
Recent examples of states confronting the issue of amnesty for past violations include
El Salvador, Panama, and Haiti. See Kim Bolan, Torture Victim Decries Recent Am-
nesty on El Salvador War Crimes, Vancouver Sun, Mar. 27, 1993, at BI; John Otis,
Amnesty Blankets Latin America, Wash. Times, May 16, 1993, at Al (discussing am-
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engaged in a "dirty war" against alleged leftist terrorism, claiming any-
where from 7000 to 30,000 lives.14 At that time in Uruguay, the mili-
tary regime used prolonged imprisonment of political opponents and
widespread torture to maintain power for more than eleven years.' 5 In
the 1980s, political violence claimed the lives of 100,000 people El Salva-
dor and Nicaragua. 6 Similar policies were also practiced in recent de-
cades in Brazil, Guatemala, and Honduras. As many of these nations
have recently returned to democracy after years of repressive military
rule, they must be encouraged to develop measures to meet their obliga-
tions to the international community: obligations to investigate, to pros-
ecute those responsible, and to compensate the victims of the past.'
Too often these governments instead are enacting amnesty laws expung-
ing the liability of the violators." All of the countries above, for exam-
ple, have passed some form of amnesty provision.' 9 These provisions
may violate international law if, as in the case of Chile, they violate the
nation's treaty obligations. An examination of Chile's amnesty decree,
therefore, is useful for demonstrating both the nature of a state's obliga-
tions under treaties that protect human rights, and the standards that
should guide a state as it formulates programs to address the violations
committed by a prior regime.
Chile's amnesty law, in particular, merits attention for three reasons.
Chile's amnesty law was the first in a series of provisions enacted in
Latin America, presenting a model for other nations.2" Also, Chile's
historic respect for legal process and tradition2' makes the existence of
its blanket amnesty law not only more offensive, but potentially more
harmful. If Chile is permitted to retain the amnesty decree in good
standing, other emerging democracies with less mature judicial histories
nesty in Panama); Robert G. Torricelli, Amnesty-A Nasty Necessity for Peace. Haiti: A
Settlement is Close, But Only a Pardon Will Get the Military to Accept Aristide, LA.
Times, May 6, 1993, at B7.
14. See Irwin P. Stotzky, The Fragile Bloom of Democracy, 44 U. Miami L. Rev.
105, 109 (1989).
15. See Jos6 Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former
Governments: Applicable Principles and Political Constraints, 13 Hamline L. Rev. 623,
655 (1990).
16. John J. Moore, Jr., Note, Problems with Forgiveness: Granting Amnesty under
the Arias Plan in Nicaragua and El Salvador, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 733, 734 (1991).
17. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 1.
18. See id at 3.
19. See id at 1.
20. Argentina, for example, explicitly modelled its law after the Chilean decree. See
Mr. Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur, United Nations Economic and Social Council,
The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees. Question of the
Human Rights of Persons Subjected to Any Form Of Imprisonment. Study on Amnesty
Laws and their Role in the Safeguard and Promotion of Human Rights, at 9, U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/ Sub.2/ 1985/16 (1985).
21. See Americas Watch, Human Rights and the "Politics of Agreements:' Chile
During President Aylwin's First Year 13 (1991) (Chile is a "profoundly legalistic coun-
try"); Vaughn, supra note 6, at 584 ("The respect of legal rules in Chilean society in-
creased the importance of preserving the appearance of an independent judiciary.").
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may be more likely to employ similar grants of impunity, thereby under-
mining fundamental human rights protections. Moreover, Chile's cur-
rent economic prosperity, admired by neighbors and viewed in part as
the result of the authoritarian measures of the Junta, threatens to vali-
date the abuses of the past and thereby to encourage, rather than to
discourage, repeated military interventions.
22
B. Events in Chile
The political, historical, and legal background to the events in Chile
provides the necessary factual context in which to explore the nature
and scope of Chile's international treaty obligations.
1. The Coup: Before and After
Prior to the 1950s, Chile generally enjoyed a long tradition of stable,
democratic rule with a powerful but politically uninvolved military.23
This changed with the global Cold War and increasing polarization of
Chilean society and politics,24 as seen in the dramatic ideological differ-
ences and narrow margins in the presidential elections of the era.25
22. See Malcolm Coad, Myths are Final Casualty of 1973 Coup, Guardian
(Manchester), Sept. 11, 1993 at 11 (citing signs of healthy economy as results of Pi-
nochet-era "harsh neoliberalism," including 10% annual growth rate, 4.5% open unem-
ployment, and investment at 27% of GDP); William R. Long, For Chile, No Clean
Break from Painful, Bloody Past, L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1993, at Al (noting claims that
Chile's economy is a "Latin American Tiger," comparing favorably to the "Asian
Tigers:" Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore); Pilling, supra note 9, at B4 (Chile is
"enjoying spectacular economic growth and sees itself as the 'Dragon' of Latin
America.").
23. See Americas Watch, Chile: Human Rights and the Plebiscite 2 (1988); Mar-
garet E. Crahan, The Evolution of the Military in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela and
Mexico: Implications for Human Rights, in Human Rights and Basic Needs 46, 61
(1982).
24. See Crahan, supra note 23, at 60-61 (discussing domestic political polarization as
contributor to military intervention); Long, supra note 22, at AI ("Chile was a symbol of
ideological struggle that divided the globe."); Jos6 Zalaquett, From Dictatorship to De-
mocracy, New Republic, Dec. 16, 1985, at 17 (background on Cold War ideologies in the
Southern Cone).
25. In 1958, rightist Jorge Alessandri defeated leftist Salvador Allende by only
33,500 out of 1,235,552 votes cast. In 1964, centrist Eduardo Frei aligned with the right
to defeat Allende, 56.1% to 38.9%. In 1970, Allende narrowly defeated Alessandri,
36.2% to 34.9%, and thus assumed office with barely a third of the population's support.
See Americas Watch, supra note 23, at 2 n.3.
At the same time, the Chilean military became increasingly enamored with the ac-
tivist, anti-marxist national security doctrine that urged intervention against domestic
subversive elements.
Essentially, the national security doctrine regards domestic political struggles
as an expression of a basic East-West conflict and sees Marxist penetration and
insurgency as an all-pervading presence of a new type of enemy fighting a new
type of war .... Since the war on Marxism is an insidious one, unorthodox
methods are called for, including torture and extermination of irredeemable
political activists.
Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 647; see also Report, supra note 2, at 54-57.
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The polarization became acute after 1970, when socialist Salvador Al-
lende was elected26 and launched the "great expeiment"-an attempt to
reform the capitalist system by introducing socialist components.2 7 In
response, rightist elements in Chile, with assistance from the United
States, undertook a program of economic destabilization-restricting
credit and causing shortages in materials, goods, and food.28 As the
conflict intensified, militant offshoots developed on both sides. On the
left, groups such as the Revolutionary Left Movement ("MIR"),29 the
Socialist Party, the United Popular Action Movement ("MAPU")3 ° and
the Christian Left advocated the use of violence both to defend the gov-
ernment and to implement the new social order." On the right, groups
such as Tacna and Fatherland & Freedom 2 openly called for military
intervention.33 Indeed, by 1973 Chile was objectively experiencing a
climate favorable to civil war.34
In this climate, on September 11, 1973, a military junta led by Gen-
eral Pinochet staged a coup. Within days, if not hours, the entire nation
was under military control .3  The Junta then assumed the executive,
26. The United States had supported the campaign of rightist Alessandri, and the
"victory of the Popular Unity and President Allende in 1970 was regarded as a triumph
of one of the contending superpowers, the USSR, and as a defeat for, and threat to, the
other, the United States." Report, supra note 2, at 51; Brian Loveman, Chile: The Leg-
acy of Hispanic Capitalism 296-97 (2d ed. 1988).
27. See Loveman, supra note 26, at 297-98; Crahan, supra note 23, at 61-63. Allende
had "promised to 'open the door to socialism' in Chile." Long, supra note 22, at A12.
The program included the "Chileanization" of key industries, particularly copper mines,
and the creation of a "social area" of public ownership within the larger economy. See
Report, supra note 2, at 52.
Nationalizations actually began in the late 1960s, when Chile compensated mine own-
ers after taking majority holdings in major mines. In 1971, a constitutional amendment
provided for full nationalization of many copper mines with compensation to be negoti-
ated later. The mines were largely owned by United States companies, and nationaliza-
tion was a significant concern of United States policy-makers, foreign corporations, and
wealthy Chileans who also resented government violation of property rights. See
Loveman, supra note 26, at 297-300.
28. See Loveman, supra note 26, at 296, 308; Report, supra note 2, at 51; Long, supra
note 22, at A12 (recalling "nightmare of economic and political chaos"). The program
added to inflation and unemployment, and helped to discredit government reform meas-
ures and to generate massive public unrest. Ultimately, the program was intended to
force the Allende regime to abandon its socialist agenda or, alternatively, to create such
disorder that the populace and the international community would support military in-
tervention. See Loveman, supra note 26, at 296-97.
29. Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria.
30. Movimiento de Accidn Popular Unificada.
31. See Report, supra note 2, at 50. Certain parties on the left, however, rejected
violence as a tactic, including the Communist Party, the Worker and Peasant United
Popular Action Movement (MAPU Obrero Campesino), the majority of the Radical
Party and President Allende himself. See id
32. Patria y Libertad.
33. See Report, supra note 2, at 50.
34. Id. at 53.
35. This Note neither examines nor draws conclusions about the merits of the mili-
tary intervention. It is worth noting, however, that persons on different sides of the
political debate welcomed the military intervention in the belief that it would stabilize
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legislative, and constituent powers of the State, but left the judicial pow-
ers formally intact, largely because a majority of the Supreme Court jus-
tices were sympathetic to the military cause.36
The powers of the State were quickly consolidated in General Pi-
nochet, who held the offices of Commander in Chief of the Army (thus
presiding over the governing Junta), Supreme Commander of the Na-
tion, and later, President of the Republic. 37 Under his authority, a se-
cret group of military officers specializing in "counterinsurgency ' '3
undertook a comprehensive program to "eliminat[e] what it regarded as
the ultraleft. ' '39 Their tactics included summary executions, 40 torture,41
the economy. Most believed that political control would be returned to civil authorities
in short order. See, e.g., Tim Rosenberg, Fall of the Patriarch: Pinochet Gives Way,
Gracelessly, New Republic, Dec. 18, 1989, at 20 (noting that even Aylwin, then president
of the Christian Democrats, supported the coup). For a full history of the events leading
up to the coup and the early years of the Junta, see Loveman, supra note 26, at 296-361.
This Note is concerned only with those violations of human rights which occurred
after the period of "pacification" (lasting no more than a week after the September 11,
1973 coup), when the military Junta had governing control of the nation and command
of all uniformed forces. See Report, supra note 2, at 129 ("Very soon after September
11, 1973 the armed forces and police ... [brought] the country under their control and
[eliminated] any pockets of armed resistance on the part of supporters of the deposed
regime. Such resistance actions can truly be said to have been minimal; ... they were
uncoordinated and had not the slightest chance of success, even locally."); see id. at 130
("Within forty-eight hours ... all armed activity in Santiago and its region had come to
a halt ....").
36. See Report, supra note 2, at 57. In general terms, the Report states that
"[d]uring the period in question the judicial branch did not respond vigorously enough
to human rights violations." Id. at 117. For a full treatment of the failures of the judici-
ary under the military government see id. at 117-26; see also Vaughn, supra note 6, at
583-88 (discussing how the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, "failed to protect
adequately persons seeking redress ... [and] appeared to condone the abuses of the
military"); William D. Zabel et al., Human Rights and the Administration of Justice in
Chile: Report of a Delegation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and of
the International Bar Association, 42 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 431, 436 (1987) ("[T]he
judiciary as a whole has shielded the government from accountability for the pervasive
rights violations inflicted by agents of the state."); id. at 438 ("Although it lays claim to
judicial independence and neutrality, the Supreme Court more typically has acted as a
political ally of the military government.").
37. See Inter-American Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Chile, OAS/ser. L./V./II.66, doc. 17, at 10 (1985). The adoption of the 1980
constitution formalizes this extraordinary concentration of power in one person. See id.
at 19-20; Americas Watch, supra note 23, at 42-43 & n.52; see generally Constituci6n
Politica de La Rep6blica de Chile, ch. IV, arts. 24-32 (1980) (President of the Republic).
38. These officers learned their philosophy of counter-insurgency and related tactics
from the United States government. See Report, supra note 2, at 48, 60-61.
39. Id. at 62.
40. See id. at 36-37, 63.
41. See id. at 38-39, 44, 63. This Note uses the definition of torture employed by the
Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, taken from Article 1 of the
Convention Against Torture, and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, which states:
[T]orture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
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disappearances,42 prolonged incommunicado detention, and forced exile,
both internal and external.43 On June 14, 1974, this group became by a
partially secret decree the National Intelligence Directorate (the
"DINA").44
The DINA was formally dissolved in early 1977.11 On April 18,
1978, the Junta issued Decree Law No. 2191, a blanket amnesty law
covering crimes from the date of the coup through March 10, 1978. The
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering aris-
ing only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
Id. at 38-39; cf Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978), in 2 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 25, 79-80 (1978) (Court report) (Distinctions between torture, inhuman treat-
ment, and degrading.treatment are derived "principally from a difference in the intensity
of the suffering inflicted."); The Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 186 (1969)
(Commission report) (defining torture as "an aggravated form of inhuman treatment,"
generally for a purpose).
42. See Report, supra note 2, at 35-36, 44, 495-98. In this Note, the expressions
"disappeared" and detenidos desaparecidos (disappeared prisoners) refers to the
following:
[The situation of those who were arrested by government agents or by persons
in their service and about whom the last information is that they were appre-
hended or that they were seen later in a secret prison. Officials deny having
arrested them, claim to have freed them after a certain period of time, offer
other unsatisfactory explanations, or simply say nothing.
[A]ll the cases ... under this term involve an arrest along with, or followed
by, measures to conceal it and official denials. Torture was generally used dur-
ing such detention, and there is a moral certainty that it ended in the victim's
death and the disposal of the remains so as to prevent their being discovered.
Id. at 35-36; see generally lain Guest, Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty
War Against Human Rights and the United Nations (1990) (discussing Argentine mili-
tary regimes' use of disappearances, with references to other Latin American nations).
43. Relegacidn or internal exile involves forced relocation to a specified urban area,
generally in a remote part of the country. Under Transitory Article 24 of the constitu-
tion, the Executive could administratively order relegacidn for up to three months. See
Americas Watch, supra note 23, at 93-94.
44. Direccidn de Inteligencia Nacional. The military government had the power to
issue secret decree orders, or include secret articles in otherwise public decrees. The
DINA, for example, was created by Decree Law No. 595, of which Articles 9, 10 and I I
were not generally published. See Report, supra note 2, at 82. Those articles allowed the
Junta to involve the intelligence services of the armed forces in the DINA's operations,
and they empowered the DINA to conduct its own raids and arrests. See id. For a full
discussion of the DINA, its functions, resources and operations during the period cov-
ered by the amnesty, 1974 through 1977, see id. at 471-505.
45. See id at 88. Decree Law No. 1876,published in Diario Oficial (Aug. 13, 1977)
(repealing Decree Law No. 521, which had created the DINA). On the same day, the
DINA was replaced by the National Center for Information (Central Nacional de In-
formacidnes ("CNI") which was created by Decree Law No. 1878, and which operated
through March 11, 1990. See id For a full discussion of the CNI, its functions, re-
sources and operations in the period of military rule not covered by the amnesty decree.
1978 through 1989, see id at 636-45.
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amnesty decree did not apply to most common crimes46 nor to those
individuals involved in the car-bomb assassination in Washington, D.C.,
of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier.47 In 1980, the
Junta consolidated constitutional documents issued from 1976 through
1979 into a new constitution that was ratified in a plebiscite held while
the nation was still under a State of Siege and Emergency.48 The new
constitution contained provisions protecting the amnesty decree, as well
as twenty-nine transitory articles creating the process for eventual return
to civilian rule.4 9
Under Transitory Articles 27 and 28, Chile began restoring democ-
racy with a 1988 plebiscite that voted General Pinochet out of the presi-
dency. o Elections followed in 1989. 51 On March 11, 1990, Patricio
46. Among those common crimes not excepted, and therefore protected by the am-
nesty law, are murder, kidnapping and assault. See infra note 71 (text of Article 3 excep-
tions). This unusual construction-forgiving major crimes while still punishing minor
offenses-highlights the Junta's purpose in promulgating the decree: protection of state
agents who had committed heinous violations of human rights. See Inter-Am. C.H.R.
128 (1978), OEA/ser. L./V./II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1979).
47. See Inter-Am. C.H.R. 128 (1978), OEA/ser. L./V./II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1979);
Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 43. Orlando Letelier, former Chilean foreign minis-
ter under the Allende government, was murdered on September 21, 1976 in Washington
D.C. when a radio-controlled bomb exploded under the front seat of his car. Ronni
Moffit, an aide to Letelier, was also killed. Michael Moffit, her husband, was injured in
the attack. See de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Ronni and Michael Moffit were United States nationals. See id. at 260. The United
States Congress pressured Chile to except those responsible from the amnesty law, con-
ditioning foreign aid on Chile's efforts to bring to justice those indicted in the United
States for their involvement in the murder, thus implicating the principle of att dedere,
autjudicare-extradite or prosecute. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
In January of 1992, the Chilean government agreed to pay compensation to Michael
Moffit and the families of Ronni Moffit and Orlando Letelier, after a five-member panel
of international arbitrators awarded them $2,611,892 in damages. See Barbara Cross-
ette, $2.6 Million Awarded Families in Letelier Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1992, at A 1.
While not dispositive evidence of Chile's recognition of affirmative obligations, it raises
the issue of compensation as a mitigating factor. See infra notes 277-81 and accompany-
ing text.
On November 12, 1993, Chilean Supreme Court Judge Adolfo Banados convicted and
sentenced retired general Manuel Contreras to seven years in prison and active-duty
brigadier general Pedro Espinoza to six years for the murders. See supra note 6.
48. See Report, supra note 2, at 83-84, 90. For a general discussion of the plebiscite,
see Americas Watch, supra note 23, at 19-29, 125-69; Jorge Correa S., Dealing With Past
Human Rights Violations: The Chilean Case After Dictatorship, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1455, 1458-60 (1992).
49. See Constituci6n Politica de La Repfiblica de Chile (1980). Most transitory Arti-
cles were effective until March 11, 1990 when President Aylwin took office. See Ameri-
cas Watch, supra note 23, app. A at 216-22; Inter-American Comm'n on Hum. Rts.,
supra note 37, at 14-17.
50. General Pinochet currently retains his position as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces. Under the 1925 constitution, Commanders-in-Chief served a four-year
term and could not be reappointed. Under Transitory Article 8 of the 1980 constitution,
however, General Pinochet could retain the position for eight years after his presidential
term ended. See Americas Watch, supra note 23, app. A at 216-17. This means that
General Pinochet could command the armed forces until March 1997, three years after
President Aylwin's term expires. See id. While Pinochet has repeatedly stated that he
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Aylwin took office as the first President of Chile's transition period.
Thus, only recently has it been possible to challenge seriously the am-
nesty decree.52
2. The Crimes
By October 1973, agents of the military and DINA began detaining
thousands of Chilean citizens. Members of the Allende government and
leftist political parties were clear targets.53 Of those known killed, fifty
percent were members of either the Socialist Party, the MIR, or the
Communist Party.54 Once arrested, detainees were subjected to pro-
longed incommunicado detention, criminal charges, acts of violence, dis-
appearance, and summary execution." Mistreatment and torture in
various forms were an "almost universal feature" of detention and inter-
ogation.56 At least thirty-seven persons were tortured to death." There
will not resign prior to 1997, President-elect Frei has pledged to seek agreements in the
Senate and Chamber of Deputies granting the president power to remove the com-
manders-in-chief, either by amending the constitution or by legislation offering "certain
'guarantees' for the general and his family, possibly protecting him from prosecution."
Frei Meets with Pinochet, Military High Command, Agence France Presse, Dec. 13,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. Constitutional amendment is un-
likely because the Frei administration does not command the necessary majority in the
Senate. See id; infra note 254 and accompanying text. Of course, guarantees of protec-
tion from prosecution raise the same concerns as the general impunity created by the
1978 amnesty decree.
51. On December 14, 1989, Patricio Aylwin was elected president with the support
of the Concertacidn, "a coalition composed of eighteen center and moderate left parties."
See Report, supra note 2, at 767 note d.
52. The Aylwin administration undertook many measures with regard to the viola-
tions of human rights committed under the military regime. See infra notes 270-95 and
accompanying text. None of these proposals seriously challenged the impunity created
by the amnesty decree and the most recent, the so called "Aylwin Law," threatened to
perpetuate it. See infra notes 297-301 and accompanying text. While this proposal was
stalled in the legislature, it helped to revive the amnesty decree as an issue facing the new
administration of Eduardo Frei, which assumes power in March of 1994. See infra note
302.
53. See Report, supra note 2, at 136.
54. See id. at 902. Moreover, reflecting the impact of Cold War ideologies, roughly
75% of the victims were under 35 years old. See id. at 902. Over 94% of the dead were
male. See id. at 901.
55. See id at 498-505.
56. Id. at 133. The official Report states:
Torture methods were extremely varied. An almost universal technique was
violent and continual beating until blood flowed and bones were broken. An-
other form was to make detention conditions so harsh that they themselves
constituted torture, for example, keeping prisoners lying face down on the
ground or keeping them standing rigid for many hours; keeping them many
hours or days naked under constant light, or the opposite, unable to see be-
cause of blindfolds or hoods, or tied up; keeping them in cubicles so narrow-
sometimes madejust for this purpose-that they were unable to move; holding
them in solitary confinement along with one or more of these conditions; deny-
ing them food or water, or clothing, or sanitary facilities. It was also common
to hang prisoners up by their arms with their feet off the ground for very long
periods of time. They might be held under water, foul smelling substances, or
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are no figures available on the number of survivors, but the physical and
emotional damage was significant.5" Similarly, there is no way to know
how many persons were detained.59
In total, state agents killed at least 1213 persons in the first four
months, including 648 executed without trial and 403 disappeared.60
They killed at least 599 more between January 1974 and August 1977,
including sixty-six executed without trial and 464 disappeared. 61 All of
these acts are covered by the amnesty decree passed in April 1978.
For the purposes of examining Chile's treaty obligations, this Note
considers only those acts involving serious violations of the physical in-
tegrity of the victim--disappearance, torture, and death.62 Such acts are
universally recognized as contrary to international law.6 a Such acts may
also constitute crimes against humanity as currently defined. Original
definitions of crimes against humanity implied a nexus to war require-
ment such that the violations in Chile might not qualify.' Subsequent
excrement to the brink of suffocation. There are many accusations of sexual
degradation and rape. A common practice was a simulated firing squad. In
some places, torturers used highly developed tortures, such as the pau de arard
[a torture practice in which a person is hung, head hanging down, by a pole or
stick placed beneath the legs and arms], [attacks by] dogs, and mistreating
prisoners in front of their relatives or vice versa.
Id. at 134; see supra note 41 (defining torture).
57. See Report, supra note 2, at 44, 141, 499, 644-45 (16 persons from September
through December 1973; 14 persons from January 1974 to August 1977; 7 persons from
August 1977 to March 1990).
58. See id. at 777-800 (discussing damage to individuals, their survivors, and society
at large from torture, disappearances and other abuses).
59. For an indication of how difficult it is to account for all of the offenses that
occurred, in 1986 (years after the worst of the repression had ended), the Chilean
Human Rights Commission recorded 21,000 cases of allanamientos-large-scale police
raids on generally poor neighborhoods involving cordoning, warrantless searches, de-
struction of property, detention, and often physical abuse. See Americas Watch, The
Vicaria de la Solidaridad in Chile 27 n. (1987); Americas Watch, supra note 23, at 76-78;
Zabel et al., supra note 36, at 435. This figure does not include any other types of deten-
tion or rights abuses, and includes only those violations actually reported.
60. See Report, supra note 2, at 154-453 (giving account of each case).
61. See id. at 507-620 (giving account of each case). Before the return to civilian
rule, at least 160 more persons died, of whom 86 were executed and 33 disappeared by
agents of the State. See id. at 645-79 (giving account of each case). The official total
reached 3877, of which 2279 have been confirmed dead and an additional 1598 involve
unresolved cases where death has been presumed. See id. at 899.
62. Rape involves serious violation of both the physical and emotional integrity of
the victim. In this Note, rape may be considered under the category of torture when the
specific circumstances so compel. See Report, supra note 2, at 134, 500; supra note 41
(defining torture and distinguishing inhuman or degrading treatment). For a general
discussion of rape as a violation of international law, see Theodor Meron, Rape as a
Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 Am. J. Int'l L. 424 (1993).
63. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537, 2580-82 (1991); see also Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture is contrary to international
law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709-10 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (recognizing the
international tort of "causing disappearances").
64. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2587 (citing the definition of crimes against
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definitions, however, omitted such nexus language.65 As crimes against
humanity, a state could derogate66 neither from its international obliga-
tions to protect individuals from such acts, nor, it has been argued, from
its obligations to hold the guilty responsible. 7
3. The Amnesty: Decree Law No. 2191
On April 18, 1978, the Junta issued Decree Law No. 2191.68 Article 1
of the decree created the greatest part of the current impunity by grant-
ing amnesty to those not yet convicted or on trial:
The Government Junta has agreed to dictate the following:
Article 1: Grant amnesty to all persons who committed, as perpetra-
tors, accomplices, or as covering up, criminal offenses during the pe-
riod of the State of Siege, between 11 September 1973 and 10 March
humanity in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, art. 6(c),
59 Stat. 1546, 1547 (1945), 82 U.N.T.S. 284 (crimes against humanity defined as "acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war")).
65. See id. at n.222, 2589 n.231 (citing definition of crimes against humanity in Con-
trol Council Law No. 10., which gave jurisdiction to war trials within occupied Ger-
many after the Nuremberg trials, as omitting nexus to war language (crimes against
humanity are "[a]trocities and offences.... or other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population")). Presumably, the violations occurring within Chile fit this
definition. See Jos6 Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints
The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 Has-
tings L.J. 1425, 1436 (1992) (stating that some of the pre-1978 offenses qualify as crimes
against humanity, at least by analogy).
66. Derogation is a means for a state to temporarily relieve itself from some or all of
its obligations under a particular law or treaty. See infra note 209 and accompanying
text.
67. See Joinet, supra note 20, at 17, V 62 (Suggestions by the General Assembly that
"torture, forced disappearances and even summary executions might ... be considered
international crimes or crimes against humanity are of considerable interest for the pur-
poses of... better defining the cases to which amnesties should not apply."); Zalaquett,
supra note 65, at 1436 (acts constituting crimes against humanity should be excluded
from measures of forgiveness). The argument that states cannot derogate from their
obligations to investigate and to punish acts constituting crimes against humanity stems
from the assertion that such acts violate peremptory norms of customary international
law. See infra note 92.
68. Decree Law No. 2191 (Apr. 18, 1978), published in Diario Oficial, No. 30,042
(Apr. 19, 1978). In the text of the Decree, the Junta noted three considerations leading
to the issuance of the amnesty decree:
Considering:
1. The general tranquility, peace and order that the country currently enjoys,
being the ends of having overcome internal disorder, making it possible to put
an end to the State of Siege and the curfew throughout the nation;
2. The ethical imperative to make all efforts conducive to strengthening the
bonds uniting the Chilean nation, leaving behind hatreds that are meaningless
today, and encouraging all those initiatives that might solidify the reunification
of Chileans;
3. The necessity of a strong national unity to support the development of the
new institutions that must govern Chile's destiny.
The Junta has agreed to dictate the following decree law: ....
Id (translation by author); Report, supra note 2, at 89.
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1978, unless they are currently on trial or have been convicted.6 9
Article 2 extended the amnesty to the military courts:
Article 2: Amnesty persons who at the time of application of this de-
cree law have been convicted by military tribunals after September 11,
1973.70
Article 3 listed common crime exceptions to the grant of amnesty, but
did not list murder, kidnapping, or assault.7' Article 4 excepted from
the grant anyone involved in the assassination of the former Chilean
Defense Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C.72 Finally, Arti-
cle 5 required persons outside of Chile (exiles or refugees) to apply for
application of the amnesty decree before they return."
While superficially benefiting all sides, in practice the decree excluded
most opponents of the government, in part because many had already
been killed, disappeared, or were in exile.74 Primarily military personnel
and their agents benefitted from the amnesty decree. 75 Thus, the decree
69. Decree Law No. 2191, art. 1 (Apr. 18, 1978); see Report, supra note 2, at 89.
70. Decree Law No. 2191, art. 2 (Apr. 18, 1978); see Report, supra note 2, at 89.
71. Article 3 states:
Not considered within the amnesty of Article 1 are those persons against
whom there have been brought criminal actions for the crimes of parricide,
infanticide, robbery by arms, violence or intimidation of persons, manufacture
or traffic of narcotics, theft, corruption of minors, arson and other disorder,
violation and rape, incest, drunk driving, embezzlement of property or public
securities, fraud and extortion, swindles and other deceptions, abuses or dis-
honesty, crimes contemplated in Decree Law No. 280 of 1974 and subsequent
modifications, bribery, fraud and smuggling, and crimes foreseen in the Tax
Code.
Decree Law No. 2191, art. 3 (Apr. 18, 1978); see Report, supra note 2, at 89.
72. Article 4 states: "Nor will they be covered by the application of Article 1, those
persons who are responsible, whether as perpetrators, accomplices, or as covering up, for
the actions being investigated in legal proceeding No. 192-78 of the military tribunal of
Santiago, Office of the Public Prosecutor, Ad-Hoc." Decree Law No. 2191, art. 4 (Apr.
18, 1978); see Report, supra note 2, at 89.
73. Article 5 states: "Persons covered by the present decree law who are currently
outside of the Republic, in order to reenter the country, must file as laid out in Article 3
of Decree Law No. 81 of 1973." Decree Law No. 2191, art. 5 (Apr. 18, 1978); Inter-
Am. C.H.R., supra note 46, at 128.
74. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 46, at 128-29. Several hundred persons im-
prisoned without formal trials, however, were released under Article 2. See Americas
Watch, supra note 21, at 43.
75. See Joinet, supra note 20, at 9, 31. Decree Law No. 2191 "benefitted princi-
pally 'those responsible for assassinations, torture and other offences committed during
the administration of the Junta, rather than to grant a genuine amnesty to political oppo-
nents.' " Id. (quoting Special Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Situation of
Human Rights in Chile, A/33/331, $ 273, and annex XXVIII).
Because the amnesty decree did not apply to individuals who were already convicted
or on trial-meaning against whom investigations were proceeding-hundreds of polit-
ical prisoners (presos policos) were imprisoned for years without convictions or under
convictions obtained despite clear violations of due process. See Americas Watch, supra
note 21, at 54-61.
At the beginning of the Aylwin administration there were approximately 500 political
prisoners. Many have been released under pardons and compromise legislation secured
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is more accurately referred to as a self-amnesty.
4. The Challenge
There is currently a petition before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights7" (the "Commission") challenging Decree Law No.
2191. The case began in August 1978, only months after the promulga-
tion of the amnesty decree, when the Vicanrz de Solidaridad" brought a
complaint on behalf of the families of seventy disappeared Chileans."8
The Second Military Tribunal of Santiago 9 held the petition in process
for eleven years.80 On November 30, 1989, the Tribunal closed thirty-
five of the cases, declaring that the amnesty law excused the crimes be-
tween 1973 and 1978.81 On August 24, 1990, the Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed that decision and the constitutionality of the amnesty
law, stating that the law terminated the judicial investigative process.82
by Aylwin, most notably those contained in the "Cumplido laws" of 1991. See id. at 52-
61; Inter-Am. C.H.R. 135-36 (1989-90), OEA/ser. L./V./II.77, doc. 7 rev. 1 (1990);
Zalaquett, supra note 65, at 1437. Eleven of these persons remain in prison as of January
1994. See Malcolm Coad, The Healing Path Through Purgatory Fire, Guardian
(Manchester), Feb. 6, 1993 at 11; William R. Long, Chile's Political Prisoners Put Aylvin
on Spot, L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1994, at A2. There is some concern that the political right
will seek to extend the application of the amnesty law from 1978 to 1998 in exchange for
a compromise on the resolution of these cases. See infra notes 296-301 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the possibility of new, expanded amnesty laws).
76. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission") and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (the "IAC")).
77. The Vican&z de Solidaridad (Vicariate of Solidarity) was organized under the
Archdiocese of Santiago to provide assistance to poor communities and to monitor viola-
tions of individual rights. The Vicar& recorded thousands of alleged violations of
human rights during the dictatorship, including hundreds of recurso de amparo (habeas
corpus) motions that helped to document disappearances, to prevent some ill-treatment
and deaths, and to secure release of some detainees. See Americas Watch, supra note 59
(full treatment of the work of the Vicanh in the protection of rights and the preservation
of legal processes in Chile); Report, supra note 2, at 81 n.1 (giving basic information on
recursos de amparo).
78. See Americas Watch, supra note 59, at 21-22; Americas Watch, supra note 21, at
45-48. Representing the families of the victims in these actions were representatives of
the Agrupacidn de Familias de los Detenidos Desaparecidos (Association of the Families
of the Disappeared Prisoners).
79. Segundo Juzgado Militar de Santiago.
80. See Americas Watch, supra note 21 at 45-48.
81. See id. at 45.
82. See id.; Report, supra note 2, at 125 ("courts have ordered procedures be halted
based on the amnesty"); Suprema Declard Constitucional Decreto Ley de Amnistb del 78
[Supreme Court Declared Constitutional the 1978 Amnesty Law], El Mercurio, Aug. 25,
1990 [hereinafter Supreme Court Declared].
Since Chile is a civil law nation, criminal procedures generally begin with an "initial
summary investigation:"
This stage begins when a complaint or suit is initiated. The judge is then inde-
pendently responsible for investigating the evidence and matters relating to the
case. If, during the course of the investigation, the judge establishes or has
reason to believe that a crime was committed, he/she may preliminarily indict
the alleged perpetrator, accomplice, or accessory.... The judge's investigation
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Thereafter, Americas Watch and the Center for Justice and Interna-
tional Law ("CEJIL") submitted a petition on behalf of the families with
the Commission, where disposition is pending.8 3
II. CHILE'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER TREATY LAW
The charter instruments of the United Nations (the "U.N.") and the
Organization of American States (the "OAS") pronounce the broad
principles of human rights protections elaborated in the respective decla-
ration of each group, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the
"Universal Declaration") 4 and the American Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of Man (the "American Declaration"). 5 Collectively, the
charters and declarations provide the clearest statement of states' obliga-
tions not to violate the human rights of the peoples under their jurisdic-
tion. International criminal treaties go further, imposing liability upon
individuals and requiring states to act against violators. Human rights
treaties present the most comprehensive protections. They contain both
prescriptive and proscriptive provisions, and recognize the rights of the
victims as individuals. By maintaining the blanket amnesty decree,
Chile violates the rights provided by these human rights treaties, partic-
ularly the American Convention on Human Rights (the "American
Convention"). 6
... may be lengthy and quite detailed. In most instances it is conducted in
camera. Upon completing the investigation the judge may decide to temporar-
ily or definitively dismiss the case or proceed to the second "plenary" stage of
the procedure during which the judge formally makes an accusation. Evidence
is then presented by the plaintiff and/or defendant and their legal representa-
tives. Finally a verdict is delivered and a sentence is ordered by the same
judge.
Report, supra note 2, at 866 note g. Moreover, by barring these summary investigations,
the Supreme Court's ruling effectively removed the means of identification of perpetra-
tors, and thereby wiped out the right of victims to fair hearings of their civil claims. Cf
Report, supra note 2, at 866 (Secret nature of initial summary investigations "violates
the human right to a hearing.").
On September 28, 1990, the Chilean Supreme Court unanimously rejected petitioners'
request for clarification. See Corte Suprema Ratificd la Plena Constitucionalidad De la
Ley de Amnistib [Supreme Court Ratified the Constitutionality of the Amnesty Law], El
Mercurio, Sept. 29, 1990 [hereinafter Supreme Court Ratified]. Petitioners assert that
the legal consequences of this decision, issued after the American Convention on Human
Rights became effective in Chile, make their claims admissible before the Commission.
See infra note 157.
83. See infra notes 161-208 and accompanying text.
84. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
85. See American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, OAS
Official Rec., OEA/ser. L./V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979) [hereinafter American Decla-
ration]. The Declaration was adopted as Resolution XXX by the Ninth International
Conference of American States, held in Bogoti, Columbia from March 30 to May 2,
1948.
86. See The American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 36 O.A.S.T.S.
1, OAS Off. Rec., OEA/ser. L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970) [hereinafter American Convention] (entered into force July 18, 1978).
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A. Charters and Declarations
Chile is a founding member of both the U.N. and the OAS." As
such, Chile is bound by the respective charters of those organizations, as
well as the Universal Declaration and the American Declaration. These
documents contain general proscriptions on state action in the area of
human rights. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the U.N.,88 for ex-
ample, obligate states to "obey and respect" the human rights specified
in the Universal Declaration. 9 Chile has previously acknowledged
these obligations.90 Similarly, membership in the OAS imposes obliga-
tions with respect to human rights, regardless of whether the state has
ratified the American Convention.91
The question, however, is not whether these instruments impose obli-
gations, but what those obligations entail. They unquestionably entail
proscriptions against specific human rights violations. They obligate
states to refrain from torture, for example. These types of negative obli-
gations are recognized both in customary and treaty law, 92 and the acts
87. See Inter-American Comm'n on Hum. Rts., supra note 37, at 43.
88. See U.N. Charter, art. 55, reprinted in 1983 U.N.Y.B. 1325, 1329-30. Article 55
states, in pertinent part, "Tlhe United Nations shall promote... (c) universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms .... " Id. Article 56
states: "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action... for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. at 1330.
89. See John Detzner, Tribunales Chilenos y Derecho Internacional de Derechos
Humanos [Chilean Courts and International Human Rights Law] 82-83 (citing Advi-
sory Opinion on the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (S.W. Africa), 1971
I.C.J. Rep. 16 obliging member states to obey and to respect human rights ("a obedecery
respetar a los derechos humanos')).
90. See id. at 82-83 nn.76-77 and accompanying text.
91. See id. at 85-86. In the Baby Boy Case, the Inter-American Commission ex-
plained that the international obligations of members of the OAS are governed by the
Charter of OAS (Bogoti, 1948), as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires on Febru-
ary 27, 1967. See Case No. 2141, The Baby Boy Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, C 15 (Res.
No. 23/81, 1980-81), OEA/ser. L./V./II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981) (United States) (dis-
cussing obligations of the United States as a member of OAS not party to the American
Convention). The Commission further explained that, as a consequence of the OAS
Charter, "the provisions of other instruments and resolutions of the OAS on human
rights, acquired binding force." Id. 16. Those instruments and resolutions include the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Bogoti, 1948), the Statute and
Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (as amended in Rio
de Janeiro, 1965), and the Statute and Regulations of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights of 1979-80. See id Where conflicts arise, therefore, OAS member states
party to the American Convention are bound by understandings of human rights under
that instrument. All other OAS member states are bound by the OAS Charter to under-
standings developed under the 1948 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man. See id 17; Inter-American Comm'n on Hum. Rts., supra note 37, C 91 & n.10.
92. Customary law evolves over time from a "general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." I Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987). Although analysts disagree
about the scope of customary law, it is universally recognized that customary law con-
tains peremptory norms which may not be ignored with impunity. See. e.g., Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A./C.39/
27 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] ("A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclu-
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committed under the Pinochet regime violated these proscriptions.
These instruments are limited, however, in their ability to prescribe
affirmative state action-investigation, prosecution of those responsible,
and compensation of victims-because their prescriptive provisions are
broadly worded and because they do not recognize individual actions,
but only actions between states. Whether Chile, under its treaty obliga-
tions, must undertake affirmative measures depends, therefore, upon ex-
amination of the more specific language of obligation contained in the
criminal and human rights treaties to which Chile is a party.
B. Criminal Treaties
International criminal treaties, unlike the charters and declarations
described previously, impose liability on individuals. They also oblige
states to take specific actions in their dealings with individuals, thereby
constraining the otherwise unfettered discretion of the state. Thus "an
amnesty law or an exercise of prosecutorial discretion that is valid under
domestic law may nonetheless breach a state's international
obligations."93
Chile is a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (the "Genocide Convention"),94 the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
sion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law."). The Vienna
Convention defines a peremptory norm as one "accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character." Id.; see also 2 Restatement, supra, § 702, comment n & n. 11. In terms of
human rights protections, it is widely accepted that customary law contains peremptory
norms that prohibit the types of acts committed in Chile-disappearances, torture and
summary executions. See, e.g., 2 Restatement, supra, § 702 (Government practices of
genocide, slavery, murder, causing disappearances, torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment are violations of customary international law.).
This Note does not examine the question of whether customary law includes affirma-
tive obligations to investigate and to prosecute for past acts, although evidence suggests
that states generally, and Chile in particular, recognize such obligations. See, e.g., Con-
sideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant(Chile), 22 Human Rights Committee (529th mtg.) at 4-5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.529
(1984) (remarks of Chilean representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission assur-
ing the investigation of disappearances and prosecution of those responsible); U.N.G.A.
Res. 33/173, l(b) (1978) (calling on Chile to "investigate and clarify the fate of persons
who have disappeared for political reasons, to inform the relatives of those persons of the
outcome of the investigation and to prosecute and punish those responsible for such
disappearances"). This Note argues that, even if customary law does not include affirm-
ative obligations to investigate and to prosecute, Chile is bound by its treaty obligations
to provide effective judicial remedies for the violation of those rights protected by the
instruments to which Chile is a party.
93. Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2553.
94. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951). The Genocide Convention entered into force in the United States
on February 23, 1989. See 28 I.L.M. 763 (1989).
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ment or Punishment (the "Convention Against Torture"),95 the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (the "Torture
Convention"),96 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (the "Geneva
Conventions").97 These instruments provide examples of a state's bind-
95. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 20, 100th Cong., G.A.
Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture] (entered into force June 26, 1987). Chile rati-
fied the Convention by Decree No. 808 on September 30, 1988, and it was published in
Diario Oficial on November 26, 1988. See Report of the Committee Against Torture,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 44, at 101, U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (1990). Chile made
several reservations, including denying the competence of the Committee Against Tor-
ture, reserving the defense of due obedience for military officers, and stipulating that
when provisions conflict, it would apply the Inter-American Convention on Torture,
which lacks the express prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment contained
in the Convention Against Torture. The Committee Against Torture has stated that the
latter two reservations are incompatible with the provisions of the Convention. See id. at
63-64, 347, 349; cf The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the Ameri-
can Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Advisory Opinion OC-2/82), '€
35, 37, September 24, 1982, OEA/ser. L./V./III/9, doc. 13 (1983) (Article 75 of the
American Convention enables states "to make whatever reservations they deem appro-
priate, provided the reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty. As such, they ... do not require acceptance by any other State Party... [and]
the instruments of ratification or adherence containing them enter force ... as of the
moment of their deposit.") (emphasis added).
96. See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 6, 1985,
O.A.S.T.S. 67, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986) [hereinafter Torture Convention] (en-
tered into force Feb. 28, 1987). Chile ratified the Convention with reservations on Sep-
tember 30, 1988 with Decree No. 809, which was published in Diario Oficial on
November 26, 1988. On May 18, 1990, Chile deposited an instrument withdrawing its
reservations to the Torture Convention (Article 4 and the last paragraph of Article 13).
See 30 I.L.M. 1148 (1991).
For a discussion of the impact of reservations in the Inter-American System, gener-
ally, and under the American Convention, in particular, see Reservations, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Advisory Opinion OC-2/82), 29 (modem human rights treaty is not a "recipro-
cal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States"); see id. ' 33 (A
human rights treaty is "a multilateral legal instrument or framework enabling States to
make binding unilateral commitments not to violate the human rights of individuals
within their jurisdiction.") (emphasis added); see id. , 35 (states may make appropriate
reservations not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty); see also Restric-
tions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human
Rights), Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (Advisory Opinion OC-3/83), V 61, September 6, 1983,
OEA/ser. L./V./III/10, doc. 10 (1984) ("[A] reservation which was designed to enable
a State to suspend any of the non-derogable fundamental rights must be deemed to be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, and consequently, not per-
mitted by it.").
97. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
(ratified by Chile at 78 U.N.T.S. 365, effective Apr. 12, 1951); Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (ratified by Chile in
78 U.N.T.S. 366, effective Apr. 12, 1951); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (ratified by Chile at
78 U.N.T.S. 367, effective Apr. 12, 1951); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75, U.N.T.S. 287
(ratified by Chile at 78 U.N.T.S. 368, effective Apr. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Geneva Con-
1994]
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ing obligations to investigate and to prosecute persons responsible for
grave violations of human rights.98
Under Article I of the Genocide Convention, for example, Chile is
bound "to prevent and to punish" those responsible for the crime of
genocide.99 Subsequent articles elaborate on these obligations, making
clear that a party state must prosecute persons before judicial tribunals,
must provide "necessary legislation" to effect such prosecutions, and
must provide "effective penalties" for those convicted." While the Ge-
nocide Convention applies only by analogy, if at all, to the DINA's
targeting of persons based on their political ideology,1 ° ' it provides an
important illustration of the principle of accountability in international
law, generally, and criminal treaties in particular.
Similarly, the Convention Against Torture obligates a state to take
action-to "extradite [or] submit [cases] to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution." 102 Although the Convention Against Tor-
ture likewise does not bind Chile with respect to the acts committed
under the Junta-because those acts occurred prior to Chile's entering
into the treaty1° 3-it provides further evidence that states, Chile in-
ventions]. The Geneva Conventions were published in Diario Oficial in 1951, and are
therefore valid in Chile. See Decree No. 752 (Dec. 5, 1950), published in Diarlo Oficial
(Apr. 17-20, 1951). On April 24, 1991, Chile ratified with declarations Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions concerning the protection of victims of armed conflicts. See Proto-
col I to the Geneva Conventions, June 8, 1977, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 30
IL.M. 1145 (1991) (the Protocol entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
98. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 94, art. VI (persons may be prose-
cuted "in the territory ... the act was committed, or by ... international penal tribu-
nal") and art. VII (genocide not political crime for purpose of barring extradition;
parties "pledge" to grant extradition); see Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2552-67; Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, Comment, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human
Rights Violations in International Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 449, 462-66 (1990).
99. Genocide Convention, supra note 94, art. I.
100. Id. at art. V.
101. The Genocide Convention defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." See Geno-
cide Convention, supra note 94, art. II; see also Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2565 ("acts
directed against 'political groups' were excluded").
102. Convention Against Torture, supra note 95, art. 7(1).
103. In a similar case from Argentina, the panel charged with interpreting the Con-
vention Against Torture, the U.N. Committee Against Torture, found that the obliga-
tions of the Convention did not apply because Argentina's amnesty provisions were
promulgated before the Convention entered into force. See Report of the Committee
Against Torture, at 108, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 44, U.N. Doc. A/45/44
(1990); Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2567 ("[T]he duty arises only when the alleged
torture occurred after the Convention entered into force with respect to the State
Party."). Since Chile's amnesty law was also promulgated before the Convention
Against Torture took effect, the Convention's obligation to prosecute is not binding.
Nevertheless, Chile may be bound by the peremptory norms against torture in custom-
ary international law. See George C. Rogers, Argentina's Obligation to Prosecute Mili-
tary Officials for Torture, 20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 259, 295-307 (1989) (arguing
that because torture has long been recognized as a crime against humanity, states are
obligated to prosecute under customary law and their ratification of the Convention
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cluded, recognize the importance of prosecuting perpetrators of grave
violations of human rights.
The Geneva Conventions also explicitly discuss obligations to dis-
cover and to prosecute violators. In 1979, Chilean jurist Hern. Monte-
alegre first argued that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply
to acts in Chile committed under the Junta."° Montealegre asserted
that the internal state of war declared by the Junta,' and affirmed by
the courts in order to justify the expanding jurisdiction of the military
tribunals,10 6 should also justify invocation of Article 3, which is com-
mon to all four of the Geneva Conventions. 0 7 Common Article 3 in-
vokes the protections of the Geneva Conventions for individuals in time
of "armed conflict not of an international character."'0 8 Since Article 3
also identifies as nonderogable certain human rights protections,'1 9
Against Torture only reinforces that obligation); supra note 92 (discussing customary
law).
104. See Hernfin Montealegre K., Los Convenios de Ginebra de 1949 Y el Caso
Chileno [The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Case of Chile] (Aug. 6, 1979) [herein-
after Montealegre, Los Convenios] (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham
Law Review); Hernizn Montealegre, La Ley de Amnistia de 1978 ante el Derecho Inter-
national [The 1978 Amnesty Law Under International Law] (no date) [hereinafter Mon-
tealegre, Amnistia] (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
105. Shortly after the coup, the Junta declared the country to be in a state of siege
(Decree Law No. 3) and a state of emergency (Decree Law No. 4). See Inter-American
Comm'n on Hum. Rts., supra note 37, at 12. Pursuant to Decree Law No. 5 of Septem-
ber 12, 1973, the state of siege was to be officially treated as a state or time of internal
war. See id.; Ver6nica Reyna et al., Proyecto de Ley Sobre Nulidad de los Efectos del
D.L. 2.191 de 1978 Sobre Amnisttz en Delitos de Violacidnes de Derechos Humanos
[Legal Project Concerning the Null Effects of D.L. 2191 of 1978 Concerning Amnesty
for Crimes in Violation of Human Rights], Reflexi6n, June 1990, at 30.
106. See Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 46 n.75 (noting August 1974 Supreme
Court decision recognizing the internal state of war).
107. See Montealegre, Los Convenios, supra note 104, at 2-5. The military's asser-
tion that it was engaged in an internal conflict with several thousand Cuban-aligned,
leftist guerrillas has been widely discredited. Montealegre's invocation of the Geneva
Conventions, therefore, should not be confused with an attempt to give credence to that
account or to any other assertion that a genuine state of war existed within Chile. Mon-
tealegre's argument attempted only to compel a measure of consistency from the State.
The Supreme Court, he argued, should either reverse its earlier decision acknowledging
an interal state of war-which would imply subsequent removal of extraordinary pow-
ers, restoration of civil liberties, and more active supervision of military courts-or ratify
the legal fiction of the internal state of war-bringing with it the protections of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
108. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 97, art. 3, reprinted in Heather A. Wilson,
International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements 43 (1988);
Montealegre, Los Convenios, supra note 104, at 3.
109. Common Article 3(1) states that the following acts "shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever... :"
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating or degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
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Montealegre argued that the amnesty law is "judicially ineffective" for
acts contrary to those protections." °
Attorney Alfonso Insunza offered this argument before the Chilean
Supreme Court."' He argued that under revised Article 5 of Chile's
1980 constitution, 112 which incorporates Chile's treaty obligations into
domestic law," I3 the Geneva Conventions are domestically at the consti-
tutional level.' Therefore, the Geneva Conventions should prevail
over the amnesty law." 5
The difficulty with this argument rests in defining "armed conflict not
of an international character.""' 6 While the text provides little gui-
dance, the history and practice associated with Common Article 3 do
not support an assertion that a state of internal war existed in Chile
under the Junta.' The Chilean Supreme Court, accordingly, declined
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
Geneva Conventions, supra note 97; Wilson, supra note 108, at 43.
110. See Montealegre, Los Convenios, supra note 104, at 11.
111. See Blanca Arthur, Ley de Amnistia: Hora de la Verdad [Amnesty Law: The
Hour of Truth], El Mercurio, July 8, 1990, at D6 (discussing the recurso de inapli-
cabilidad, infra note 162, filed by Insunza in Case No. 553-78, Manuel Contreras y
otros); Impunidad Ante la Encruciada [Impunity at the Crossroads], Pluma y Pincel,
July 19-Aug. 1, 1990 (same).
112. Before amendment, Article 5 read, "The exercise of sovereignty recognizes as its
limit the respect of those essential rights that emanate from the human nature." ("El
ejercicio de la soberanit reconoce como limitacidn el respeto a los derechos esenciales que
emanan de la naturaleza humana."). The amendment added, "The Organs of the State
must respect and promote such rights, guaranteed by this constitution, as well as by the
international treaties ratified by Chile that have entered into force." ("Es deber de los
drganos del Estado respetar y promover tales derechos, garantizados por esta Constitucidn,
asi' como por los tratados internacionales ratificados por Chile y que se encuentren
vigentes.") See Constituci6n Politica de La Repfiblica de Chile, art. 5; Comit6 de
Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo, La Constituci6n de 1980 y sus Reformas 15 (1980).
113. Others have expressed similar views regarding the role of revised Article 5 in
relation to the amensty law. Minister of Justice Francisco Cumplido, for example, stated
that the change to Article 5 and recent treaty ratifications worked as "tacit derogation"
of the amnesty decree. See Ministro de Justicia: Es Innecesaria una Ley Interpretiva de
la Amnistt& [Minister of Justice: An Interpretive Law is Unnecessary], La Segunda, June
19, 1990; see also Arthur, supra note 111, at D6 (citing Minister Cumplido as among
those lawyers alleging "tacit derogation"); El Porque ministro Cerda no dicto el 'Cum-
plase' en fallo sobre 10 detenidos-desaparecidos [The Reason Judge Cerda did not Rule
'Closed' the Case of 10 Disappeared Prisoners], La Segunda, Aug. 2, 1990 (discussing
opinion by Judge Carlos Cerda citing Article 5 as derogation of the amnesty law).
114. See Impunity at the Crossroads, supra note 111, at D6; see also Reyna, supra note
105, at 30-31 (discussing proposal for an interpretive law based on the same argument);
Long, supra note 6 (noting similar challenge based on international treaties presented by
Insunza in the case of Carmen Soria).
115. See Arthur, supra note 111, at D6; Impunity at the Crossroads, supra note I11.
116. See Wilson, supra note 108, at 45 ("[T]he greatest barrier to [Article 3's] applica-
tion has been that 'armed conflict not of an international character' has not been
defined.").
117. See Wilson, supra note 108, at 45-48. As noted above, those persons attempting
to invoke the protections of Common Article 3 would not necessarily dispute the finding
that a state of internal war did not exist in Chile. See supra note 107.
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to recognize the applicability of the Geneva Conventions,"' despite the
apparent contradiction of their holding with their earlier ruling en-
abling the expanded jurisdiction of the military courts." 9 The Court
also declined to examine the issue of the tacit derogation of the amnesty
law under Article 5.12° The Supreme Court did not, however, deny
Chile's obligations to investigate and prosecute under the Geneva Con-
ventions, once applied.
Chile, therefore, is not explicitly bound, under the criminal treaties to
which it is a party, to investigate and to prosecute those responsible for
the violations of the past. As interpreted by the Chilean courts, those
violations were either not within the treaty's parameters or occurred
prior to Chile's entering into the particular instrument. 1t Nonetheless,
Chile's ratification of these treaties manifests its recognition of the im-
portance of identifying and punishing those responsible for grave viola-
tions of human rights. Chile's ratification of multilateral human rights
treaties, moreover, not only provides further evidence of this recogni-
tion, but also establishes binding obligations applicable to the crimes of
the past.
C. Human Rights Treaties
Chile is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (the "International Covenant")' 22 and the American Conven-
118. See Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 46 n.75. The rejection of this challenge
constituted an exhaustion of domestic remedies such that the case was then presented to
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. See Americas Watch, supra note 21,
at 45-46.
119. See supra note 105.
120. The court noted that none of the international agreements in force in Chile lim-
ited the State's power to grant amnesty, and that the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights explicitly recognized that power. See Supreme Court Declared,
supra note 82.
121. Again, this Note does not address the question of whether Chile is bound by
affirmative obligations to investigate and to prosecute stemming from customary interna-
tional law. See supra note 92.
122. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter International Covenant] (en-
tered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for the U.S. on Sept. 8, 1992). Chile ratified the Cove-
nant on February 10, 1972 and promulgated it as Decree Law No. 778 of November 30,
1976. See Inter-American Comm'n on Hum. Rts., supra note 37, at 43. However, be-
cause the military government refused to publish the law in Diario Oficial, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Covenant as ineffective in Chile as to events under the military
government. See id. This interpretation has been challenged by jurists in Chile and
abroad, who argue that neither publication nor even promulgation is necessary for the
law to be effective once it has been properly ratified. See id. at 309 n.9 (citing as example
Professor Hugo Rosende's assertion that the "law is perfect and definitive from the time
it has been approved by the competent agencies"). Ultimately, the military government
published the instrument in Diarlo Oficial on April 29, 1989. See Americas Watch,
supra note 21, at 45.
On May 27, 1992, Chile acceded to the Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, concerning recognition of the Human Rights Corn-
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tion.'23 These multinational human rights treaties expand the protec-
tions of charters, declarations, and criminal treaties. Where charters
and declarations contain broad proscriptive provisions, human rights
treaties also contain prescriptive language. This language, however, is
unlike the prescriptive language in the criminal treaties discussed above.
The language in human rights treaties does not explicitly require the
state to investigate and to punish past violations,'24 although authorita-
tive interpretations of treaty provisions calling on states to respect and to
ensure human rights strongly indicate that states are obligated to ad-
vance cases involving the most serious violations.125 Moreover, the pre-
scriptive language in human rights treaties recognizes the right of
victims to effective remedies for violations of protected, substantive
rights. 126 Ultimately, Chile must dismantle the amnesty decree because
it obstructs any meaningful exercise of these independent, remedial
rights.
1. Respect-and-Ensure Provisions
The respect-and-ensure provisions that are common to human rights
treaties obligate states to investigate and to punish past violations of fun-
damental rights.127
Comments by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (the
mittee. The Protocol entered into force in Chile on August 27, 1992. Chile's accession,
however, contains the following declaration:
In recognizing the competence of the Human Rights Committee... it is the
understanding of the Government of Chile that this competence applies in re-
spect of acts occurring after the entry into force for that State of the Optional
Protocol or, in any event, to acts which began after 11 March 1990.
U.N. Depositary Notification, Aug. 27, 1992, Ref. No. C.N. 178.1992.Treaties-5/10/5
(accession by Chile). The accession, therefore, does not recognize the competence of the
Committee for events prior to President Aylwin's term, including all acts of the military
government.
123. See American Convention, supra note 86. Chile ratified the American Conven-
tion on August 21, 1990. See 30 I.L.M. 575 (1991). It was published in Diario Oficial on
January 5, 1991. See Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 45.
124. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2568; Goldman, supra note 3, at 5.
125. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2568.
126. See id. at nn.129-32 and accompanying text; Anne M. Latcham, Note, Duty to
Punish: International Law and the Human Rights Policy of Argentina, 7 B.U. Int'l L.J.
355, 373 (1989); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 98, at 475.
127. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2568. Article 2(1) of the International Cove-
nant states, in pertinent part:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights rec-
ognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind ....
International Covenant, supra note 121, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, Article
1(1) of the American Convention states, in pertinent part:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and free-
doms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction
the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimina-
tion ....
American Convention, supra note 86, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
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"U.N. Committee"), the body charged with interpreting the Interna-
tional Covenant, support this finding. Relating to the proper interpreta-
tion of Article 2(1) and its requirement that each party "undertakes to
respect and to ensure ... the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant,"' 128 the U.N. Committee stated:
[I]t follows from article 7 [which prohibits torture], read together with
article 2 of the Covenant, that States must ensure an effective protec-
tion through some machinery of control. Complaints about ill-treat-
ment must be investigated effectively by competent authorities. Those
found guilty must be held responsible ....
The U.N. Committee's decisions in a number of cases have applied this
interpretation of obligations arising under the respect-and-ensure lan-
guage of Article 2 of the International Covenant.3 0
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 3' (the "IAC") is part of
the system of human rights protections established under the OAS and
128. International Covenant, supra note 121, art. 2(1).
129. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
at 7(16), 1, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982). The quote continues, "and the alleged victims
must themselves have effective remedies at their disposal, including the right to obtain
compensation." Id.
130. See, eg., Communication No. 124/1982 (Muteba v. Zaire), U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984) (finding Zaire obligated to inves-
tigate and to punish those responsible for torture); Communication No. R.7/30 (Bleier
v. Uruguay), U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 136, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982)
(finding Uruguay obligated to investigate disappearance and probable death, to punish
and to provide compensation); Communication No. 107/1981 (Quinteros v. Uruguay),
U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 224, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983) (finding
Uruguay obligated to investigate disappearance, to secure release from detention, to pun-
ish and to provide compensation).
131. The Inter-American Court (the "IAC") was established in 1979 to apply and
interpret the American Convention. See Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, Oct. 31, 1979, OAS GA Res., 9th Sess. (1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 634 (1980)
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1980). The IAC may also interpret other human rights trea-
ties and may examine the compatibility of the domestic law of member states with obli-
gations under those instruments. See "Other Treaties" Subject to the Consultative
Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Advisory Opinion OC-1/82), 52, September 24, 1982, OEA/ser. L./V./III/
9, doc. 13, app. I (1983). The IAC has advisory jurisdiction under which it may accept
requests for interpretive opinions from OAS member states and permanent OAS bodies,
like the Commission. See id $ 14-31. It also has contentious jurisdiction limited to
interpretation and application of the Convention. See Statute of the Inter-American
Court, supra, at 635. Rulings under the IAC's contentious jurisdiction are binding on
member states. See Dinah Shelton, Improving Human Rights Protections Recommen-
dations for Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 3 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 323, 328 (1988) (discuss-
ing powers and functions of the Court). The IAC may order restoration of rights or
payment of compensation. For enforcement, the IAC may submit its decisions to the
General Assembly or the Permanent Council of the OAS for review and possible sanc-
tion. See generally Paul Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights 401-14
(1983) (powers, composition, mandate, and procedures of the Commission and Court);
Juan E. M~ndez & Jos6 M. Vivanco, Disappearances and the Inter-American Court: Re-
flections on a Litigation Experience, 13 Hamline L. Rev. 507, 519-21, 527-30 (1990)
(overview of the Inter-American system).
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consisting principally of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights'32 (the "Commission") and the IAC. Like the U.N. Commit-
tee's interpretation of the International Covenant, the IAC has found
affirmative obligations in the American Convention. 3 3 In two of its first
three contentious cases,"3 4 all involving the disappearance of persons in
Honduras, the IAC found obligations to investigate, to punish, and to
compensate 135 arising out of the general respect-and-ensure language of
Article 1(1) when coupled with the violation of other specific provisions
of the American Convention, in these cases Article 4 (life), Article 5
(humane treatment) and Article 7 (liberty). 36
The most significant of these cases was the Velfisquez Rodriguez
Case.137 The complaint, filed with the IAC in April 1986, concerned the
arrest, torture, and murder of a student activist by the Honduran mili-
132. Founded in 1959, the Commission is an advisory board empowered to monitor
and protect human rights under both the American Convention and the American Dec-
laration on the Rights and Duties of Man. The Commission is a quasi-judicial body
having both legal and political powers. The Commission has three main goals: address-
ing individual complaints of human rights violations, reporting on the human rights
situation in OAS states, and promoting steps to increase respect for human rights.
Methods commonly used by the Commission include investigation of complaints, media-
tion between parties, publication of resolutions, including resolutions condemning a
party's actions with regard to actual violations or noncompliance with the Commission,
submission of reports to the General Assembly of the OAS and referral of cases to the
Inter-American Court (the "IAC"), provided the parties have recognized the IAC's con-
tentious jurisdiction. See Sieghart, supra note 131, at 403-04; M6ndez & Vivanco, supra
note 131, at 519-27; Shelton, supra note 131, at 323-29.
133. The Commission has found that the obligations of states in the Inter-American
system are rooted in the OAS Charter, through which the principles of the other instru-
ments of the OAS have acquired binding force. See Case No. 2141, The Baby Boy Case,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, T 15-16 (Res. No. 23/81), OEA/ser. L./V./II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1
(1981) (United States). OAS member states party to the American Convention are
bound by understandings of human rights under that instrument, as interpreted by the
Commission and the IAC. See id. 1 17.
134. See Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, Judgment of
July 29, 1988, OEA/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988); Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 5, Judgment of January 20, 1989.
135. In the third case, the IAC disagreed with the Commission and found insufficient
evidence that the disappearances had occurred in Honduras, and therefore did not ad-
dress the issue of affirmative obligations. See Fair6n Garbi and Solis Corrales Case,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 6, Judgment of March 15, 1989.
136. See Dinah Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibility of
States, 13 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1, 9-11 (1989-90); Goldman, supra note 3, at 5. The IAC
noted:
The second obligation of the States Parties is to "ensure" the free and full
exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to every person subject to
its jurisdiction .... As a consequence of this obligation, the States must pre-
vent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the
Convention.
Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, 1 166.
137. Vel6squez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, Judgment of July
29, 1988, OEA/ser. L./V./III.19, doe. 13 (1988).
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tary.'3 8 In its decision of July 29, 1988, the IAC found Honduras in
violation of its obligations under the American Convention. Without
proving the state's involvement in the specific violations asserted, the
IAC recognized a general pattern of rights abuses, and found that the
Honduran government's failure to guarantee the rights enumerated in
the American Convention against that pattern was itself a violation of
the state's "affirmative" duties.139 These duties, the IAC explained, are
rooted in the obligation to "ensure" human rights found in Article I of
the American Convention. 14°
Had Chile been a party to the International Covenant or the Ameri-
can Convention at the time of the Junta, the amnesty decree would
openly conflict with the determinations of the U.N. Committee and the
IAC regarding the affirmative obligations to investigate and to punish
past human rights violations.'41 Because Chile may not have effectively
ratified, promulgated, and published these treaties until 1990,142 how-
ever, the violations of the past may not be directly implicated by the
interpretive holdings of the respect-and-ensure provisions of Article 1 (1)
of the American Convention and Article 2(1) of the International Cove-
nant alone. 43 Those violations are addressed, however, by Chile's in-
138. See Velisquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, " 2; Shelton,
supra note 136, at 5-6; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 98, at 469.
139. See Velisquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, Or 160-67;
Shelton, supra note 136, at 9-10.
140. See Shelton, supra note 136, at 11-14. The IAC noted:
The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights
violations, and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investiga-
tion of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsi-
ble, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate
compensation.
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, " 174.
141. Chile was a member of both the U.N. and the OAS at the time of the Junta, and
therefore was bound to prevent violations of the rights protected by their respective
charters and declarations. See, eg., Case No. 2141, The Baby Boy Case, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 25, 15-16 (Res. No. 23/81, 1980-81), OEA/ser. L./V./II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1
(1991) (United States) (International obligation of a member of the OAS is governed by
the Charter.). The language of those instruments, therefore, may provide an additional
basis for asserting Chile's affirmative obligation to investigate and to punish those re-
sponsible for the acts committed under the Junta. This assertion, however, lacks the
benefits of the more developed language of protection in the International Covenant and
the American Convention, as well as the explicit interpretation of that language in cases
such as Velfsquez.
142. See supra notes 86 & 121.
143. In its decision in a recent case challenging Uruguay's amnesty provisions, the
Commission distinguished the present-time claim of denial of justice under Articles 8
and 25 (in relation to Article 1(1)) from claims based on past violations of substantive
rights "which triggered the right to a fair trial and the right to judicial protection, but
that occurred before the Convention entered into force for Uruguay on April 19, 1985,
and therefore were not a subject of these complaints." Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145,
10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, and 10.375, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, " 53, OEA/ser. L./
V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993) (Uruguay).
In a related case challenging Argentina's amnesty provisions, the Commission distin-
guished the petitioner's right to economic compensation for "the original or substantive
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dependent, present-time obligations under provisions in each treaty
requiring effective judicial remedies for violations of protected rights, as
well as by the "free and full exercise" provision of Article 1(1) of the
American Convention.
2. Present-Time Obligations
Both the International Covenant and the American Convention rec-
ognize an individual's right to effective remedies under international
law." Article 2(3) of the International Covenant provides to "any per-
son" a right to "an effective remedy," determined "by competent judi-
cial, administrative or legislative authorities," and enforced "by
competent authorities."' 45 The history of the Article indicates that it
was directly intended to provide accountability for violations committed
by state agents.146 As with the respect-and-ensure language in Article
2(1) and (2), the U.N. Committee has interpreted Article 2(3) to oblige
states to use their resources to investigate, to punish violators, and to
compensate victims of past abuses. 147 The U.N. Committee's decisions
in several Uruguayan cases reflect this interpretation. 4 '
violations, most of which took place ... before Argentina's ratification of the Conven-
tion" and the denial of justice that "was the legal consequence of the [amnesty] laws...
at issue." Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, and 10.311, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
41, V 51, OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993) (Argentina). The Commission
noted: "While both questions ... are intimately related, they must not be confused.
Each question materially differs and moreover concerns events that occurred at different
times; the rights or provisions of the Convention affected also differ." Id.
144. See International Covenant, supra note 121, art. 2(3)(a)-(c); American Conven-
tion, supra note 86, art. 25(2). Note that these obligations are independent of other,
prospective provisions in each treaty requiring member states "to give [domestic] effect
to" the rights protected in each instrument. See International Covenant, supra note 12 1,
art. 2(2); American Convention, supra note 86, art. 2.
145. International Covenant, supra note 121, art. 2(3)(a)-(c). Article 2(3) of the Inter-
national Covenant states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authori-
ties, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of
the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
Id.
146. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 98, at 476.
147. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
148. In the Bleier case, for example, the Committee concluded that Uruguay "has the
duty to investigate in good faith ... [to] bring to justice any persons found to be respon-
sible for [Bleier's] death . . .and to pay compensation." Communication No. R.7/30
(Bleier v. Uruguay), U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 135-36, U.N. Doc. A/37/
40 (1982). In the Quinteros case, the Committee similarly concluded that Uruguay "has
a duty to conduct a full investigation ... to bring to justice any persons found to be
responsible for [Quinteros'] disappearance and ill treatment ... [and to] pay compensa-
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Similarly, Article 25 of the American Convention states: "Everyone
has a right to simple and prompt recourse... against acts that violate
his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the
state concerned or by this Convention." 14 9 Article 8.1, moreover, pro-
vides petitioners with a right to a fair hearing for the "determination of
[their] rights... of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature."'5 ° The
Commission has explained that these rights to a hearing and judicial
protection are interpreted, like the conduct-specific articles discussed
above, in conjunction with the obligations in the language of Article
1().151
In addition to the respect-and-ensure language common to both the
American Convention and the International Covenant, the IAC has
tion for the wrongs suffered." Communication No. 107/1981 (Quinteros v. Uruguay),
U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 224, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983).
149. American Convention, supra note 86, art. 25(2). Encompassing the right to judi-
cial protection, Article 25 states:
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effec-
tive recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts
that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws
of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation
may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official
duties.
2. The State Parties undertake:
a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights
determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal sys-
tem of the state;
b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and
c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.
Id at art. 25.
150. American Convention, supra note 86, art. 8(1). Article 8(1) states:
Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previ-
ously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal
nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations
of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature.
Id (emphasis added). Note that the Convention applies the term "hearing" to the rights
of defendants and petitioners in both criminal and civil proceedings. In an attempt to
distinguish these roles, this Note shall, wherever possible, employ the term "hearing" to
refer to the general right protected by the Convention, and restrict the term "trial" to
refer specifically to criminal prosecutions.
151. Regarding an amnesty law in Uruguay, the Commission described a denial of
justice claim as stemming from Article 1: "[T]he Commission must make clear that the
purpose of these petitions is to object to the denial of justice (Articles 8 and 25 in relation
to Article 1 of the Convention) with enactment and application of the 1986 [amnesty]
Law ...." Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, and 10.375,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, 53, OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993) (Uruguay).
Regarding Argentina's amnesty provisions the Commission stated: "[T]he violation
of the right to a fair trial (Article 8) and of the right to judicial protection (Article 25) in
relation to the obligation of the States to guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights
recognized in the Convention (Article 1.1) is denounced as incompatible with the Con-
vention." Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, and 10.311, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
41, 50, OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993) (Argentina).
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drawn on language in Article 1(1) of the American Convention that ob-
ligates state parties to ensure "the full and free exercise" of the protected
rights and freedoms. 5 2 The IAC stated in the Velasquez Case:
If the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes un-
punished and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored
as soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to
ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons within
its jurisdiction. 15 3
The IAC therefore reasoned that the state must affirmatively "organize
the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through
which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights." '54
The Commission has noted, moreover, that with respect to this affirm-
ative guarantee of free and full exercise, the rights to a hearing and judi-
cial protection are distinct from the rights violated under substantive,
conduct-specific articles protecting physical integrity. Substantive viola-
tions which occurred in the past might not be covered by subsequently
assumed treaty obligations.1 5 5 In contrast, the Commission has indi-
cated that the rights to a hearing and judicial protection involve distinct,
152. American Convention, supra note 86, art. 1(1) (For the text of Article 1(1), see
supra note 127.). This language may distinguish the breadth of a state party's obligation
to ensure protected rights under Article 1(1) of the American Convention from the same
obligation under Article 2 of the International Covenant, which lacks explicit reference
to the affirmative "exercise" of protected rights. See International Covenant, supra note
127, art. 2. Moreover, the IAC's broad interpretation of the obligation to ensure pro-
tected rights in the Velfsquez Case does not bind the Human Rights Committee in its
interpretation of Article 2 of the International Covenant (Upon proper request, however,
the IAC may issue its own advisory opinion on "any provision dealing with the protec-
tion of human rights set forth in any international treaty [including the International
Covenant] applicable in the American States." "Other Treaties" Subject to the Consult-
ative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Advisory Opinion OC-1/82), 52, September 24, 1982, OEA/ser. L./V./
111/9, doc. 13, app. 1 (1983)). These distinctions suggest that the recognition of affirma-
tive, present-time obligations requiring dismantling of an amnesty law may be currently
more difficult to achieve under the International Covenant than under the American
Convention.
153. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, 1 176 (emphasis
added).
154. Id. 1 166. The Court further noted:
The obligation to ensure the free and full exercise of human rights is not ful-
filled by the existence of a legal system designed to make it possible to comply
with this obligation - it also requires the government to conduct itself so as to
effectively ensure the free and full exercise of human rights.
Id. 1 167 (emphasis added). This statement suggests that states have an affirmative obli-
gation to effect measures beyond the mere procedural obligations of Article 2, which
requires states to adopt legislative or other measures that "give effect" to protected
rights. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 4. Amnesty laws which prohibit the effective
exercise of protected rights (such as the right to a hearing (Article 8) and judicial protec-
tion (Article 25)) would appear to interfere with this affirmative obligation.
155. See supra note 143 (distinguishing denial of justice claims from underlying sub-
stantive violations).
1994] CHALLENGING GRANTS OF AMNESTY
present-time obligations.1 56 A state violates these obligations at such
time as the legal consequences of an official state action bar effective
exercise of one of these rights.1 57
A state, therefore, commits a distinct violation of its treaty obligations
by applying amnesty provisions that obstruct fair hearings or other rem-
edies after the state has become a party to the American Convention (or
by analogy the International Covenant), at least in so far as the amnesty
decree precludes civil claims for remedy against state agents or the state
itself. 5 ' Such a violation is presently actionable, even if the underlying
substantive violations occurred before the treaty was in effect with re-
spect to the offending state.' 9 Chilean Decree Law No. 2191, therefore,
would appear to violate Chile's treaty obligations under the American
156. See supra note 143.
157. In the recent Uruguay cases, the Commission noted that "[w]hat is denounced as
being incompatible with the Convention are the legal consequences of the law with re-
spect to the right to a fair trial." Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373,
10.374, and 10.375, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, 40, OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1
(1993) (Uruguay); see also Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, and 10.311,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 33, OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993) (Argentina)
(same). The Commission also noted that "[w]hen it enacted the [amnesty] law, Uruguay
ceased to guarantee the rights stipulated in Article 25.1 and violated the Convention."
Uruguay Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, 49 (1993); see also Argentina Cases, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 41, 39 (1993) (same).
At first consideration of these statements, the Commission appears to have equated
the date of legal consequences with the date of the amnesty provision's enactment. This
interpretation might have the effect of barring the challenge to Chile's amnesty decree
currently before the Commission. Chile's amnesty decree was enacted years before the
Convention took effect in Chile, whereas the amnesty provisions in Uruguay and Argen-
tina were enacted after the Convention took effect for those nations. See, e.g., Argentina
Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 50 (1993) ("These violations occurred with enactment of
the disputed legal measures in 1986, 1987 and 1989, after the Convention had entered
into force for Argentina in 1984.").
A closer examination of the facts in each nation indicates, however, that the date of
legal consequences may differ from the date of enactment, especially where the amnesty
provisions were not definitively applied until a later date. The Commission appeared to
support this interpretation in the case of Uruguay, when it stated: "By enacting and
applying the Law the Uruguayan Government failed to abide by the obligation to guar-
antee observance of the rights ... and thereby infringed those rights and violated the
Convention." Uruguay Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, 46 (1993) (emphasis added).
Since the definitive application of the amnesty law in Chile was established by Supreme
Court's decision of August 1990 affirming its constitutionality, the petitioner's challenge
should proceed under the Convention, which by then was in effect.
158. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 5. Professor Goldman notes that "preclusion of
such a civil remedy to the victim would make illusory the State's obligations to respect,
ensure and remediate internally violations of guaranteed rights .. " Id. Thus a state is
obligated to investigate and to allow recourse to adequate compensation for current
claims of denial of justice. See Uruguay Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, Ir 50 (obligation
to investigate), 53 (compensation for denial of justice) (1993); Argentina Cases, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 41, 40 (obligation to investigate), 1 51-52 (compensation) (1993). A
requirement of criminal prosecution under Article 1(1), however, while supported by
dicta in the Velasquez case and subsequent Commission reports concerning Uruguay
and Argentina, remains undetermined. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 5.
159. See, eg., Argentina Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, il 50-52 (1993) (recommending
compensation for current denial of justice claim distinct from substantive violations oc-
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Convention, and by analogy the International Covenant, in so far as it
has been applied to obstruct investigations and hearings. A challenge to
Chile's amnesty decree based in part on this assertion is presently being
heard by the Commission.
3. Challenging Grants of Amnesty in the Inter-American System 60
Recent decisions by the Commission and the IAC, building on earlier
interpretations of a member state's obligations, urge the conclusion that
Chile's amnesty decree is incompatible with the guarantees of the Amer-
ican Convention.
a. Case History
A complaint challenging Chile's amnesty decree is pending before the
Commission.' Prior to filing with the Commission, petitioners had
filed a recourse of inapplicability with the Second Military Tribunal in
Santiago, for transmission to the Chilean Supreme Court. 162 The peti-
tion included arguments that international law, including the Geneva
Conventions1 63 and the Genocide Convention,'64 barred the grant of
amnesty and that the 1988 revisions to Article 5 of the constitution 65
(incorporating Chile's international obligations into domestic law) tac-
itly derogated the decree law.' 66
On August 24, 1990, the Supreme Court dismissed the recourse.' 67
On September 28, 1990, the Court unanimously rejected petitioners' re-
quest for clarification, confirming the earlier dismissal. 68 Petitioners
'thereafter filed their complaint with the Commission on March 27,
curring prior to the Convention's taking effect in the state, compensation for the latter
not being required).
160. The author respects the confidential nature of the Commission's proceedings
pending publication of a report of settlement (Article 48) or other resolution (Article
51). See infra note 173. The discussion of the case, infra, including petitioner's
argument and the government's response, is therefore without the benefit of official
source material and is compiled from secondary sources, analogy to comparable actions,
and interviews.
161. See Case No. 10.843 (Chile), Inter-Am. C.H.R. (filed Mar. 27, 1991).
162. Rol. No. 27,640. The recourse of inapplicability (recurso de inaplicabilidad por
inconstitucionalidad) "permits a defendant (or his/her defense) to argue that a law or
proceeding is unconstitutional and therefore 'inapplicable.'" Report, supra note 2, at 81
1; see Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 45.
163. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 97; supra notes 103-17 and accompanying
text.
164. See Genocide Convention, supra note 94; supra notes 98-100 and accompanying
text.
165. For the text of revised Article 5, see supra note 112.
166. See Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 45-46; Arthur, supra note 111, at D6;
Impunity at the Crossroads, supra note 111; Supreme Court Declared, supra note 82.
167. See Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 45; Supreme Court Declared, supra note
82.
168. See Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 46 (noting rejection of petitioners' recurso
de aclaracidn (request for clarification)); Supreme Court Ratified, supra note 82.
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1991.169 The government of Chile filed a response on August 19,
1991.1'0 Petitioners filed a counter-response on October 5, 1993, ad-
dressing the government's claims of inadmissibility and requesting a
continuation of the proceedings.1 71  This counter-response will most
likely result in a hearing,'72 after which a report from the Commission
would be expected within a year.1
7 3
169. See Case No. 10.843 (Chile), Inter-Am. C.H.R. (filed Mar. 27, 1991).
170. The Commission's procedures for the handling of complaints may be found at
Articles 48-51 of the American Convention, and in the Commission's Regulations.
Article 48(1) of the American Convention sets out generally the Commission's proce-
dures for processing a petition or communication:
a. If it considers the petition... admissible, it shall request information from
the government of the state indicated as being responsible for the alleged viola-
tions ....
b. After the information has been received.., the Commission shall ascertain
whether the grounds for the petition... still exist. If they do not, the Commis-
sion shall order the record to be closed.
c. The Commission may also declare the petition... inadmissible or out of
order on the basis of information or evidence subsequently received.
d. If the record has not been closed, the Commission shall, with the knowl-
edge of the parties, examine the matter ... to verify the facts ... [and if]
necessary... carry out an investigation ....
e. The Commission may request ... information, and, if so requested, shall
hear oral statements or receive written statements ....
f. The Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned
with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of
respect for the human rights recognized in this Convention.
American Convention, supra note 86, art. 48(1). Article 48(2) provides an accelerated
procedure for "serious and urgent cases."
Articles 49-51 address the settlement of complaints and the transmission and publica-
tion of Commission reports, including findings and recommendations. See infra note
173.
171. The proceedings had been suspended after December 17, 1991, at which time the
Commission had received from the governments of Argentina and Uruguay a request for
an advisory opinion on the interpretation of several relevant articles of the American
Convention. The decision was released on July 16, 1993. See Certain Attributes of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Arts. 41, 42, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the
American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Advisory Opinion OC-
13/93), July 16, 1993.
172. See American Convention, supra note 86, art. 48(l)(e) (petitioners may request
oral hearing).
173. The public release of the Commission's report, however, may take longer, de-
pending upon the nature of the resolution. Articles 49-51 of the Convention govern the
Commission's transmission and publication of findings and recommendations. Article
49 governs publicly released reports resulting from settlement between the parties. Arti-
cle 49 states:
If a friendly settlement has been reached in accordance with paragraph lf of
Article 48 [(supra note 170)], the Commission shall draw up a report, which
shall be transmitted to the petitioner and to the States Parties to this Conven-
tion, and shall then be communicated to the... [OAS] for publication. This
report shall contain a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached.
American Convention, supra note 86, art. 49.
Articles 50-51 govern the transmission and publication of confidential reports on com-
plaints where settlements are not reached. Article 50 states:
1. If a settlement is not reached, the Commission shall ... draw up a report
1994]
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b. Argument
Petitioners advanced claims based on the rights of the families of the
victims to fair hearings and to judicial protection and remedy, under
Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, respectively. 74 Petition-
ers also alleged that the Supreme Court's August 24, 1990 finding that
the amnesty decree terminates the judicial process-thereby barring in-
vestigation and identification of those responsible-violates Chile's obli-
gations to prevent, to investigate, and to punish under the respect-and-
ensure language of Article 1.175 Finally, petitioners argued that the am-
nesty decree is incompatible with Chile's obligations under Article 2
(state parties undertake to give effect to Convention provisions through
domestic laws) and Article 43 (state parties undertake to provide infor-
mation regarding domestic measures taken to ensure protected rights) of
the American Convention.1
7 6
Petitioners therefore asked the Commission to find that, because of
the amnesty decree, the government of Chile has failed to ensure fair
hearings and judicial remedies for past violations, to declare that such
failure is incompatible with Chile's obligations under the American Con-
vention, and to recommend investigation and compensation. 7 7
In its response, the government offered procedural and substantive ob-
jections. Procedurally, Chile argued that petitioners had not exhausted
internal remedies as required by Article 46(l)(a), and that the petition to
setting forth the facts and stating its conclusions.... [attaching any] separate
[dissenting] opinion .... [and the] written and oral statements made by the
parties in accordance with paragraph i.e of Article 48 ....
2. The report shall be transmitted to the states concerned, which shall not be
at liberty to publish it.
3. In transmitting the report, the Committee may make such proposals and
recommendations as it sees fit.
American Convention, supra note 86, art. 50 (emphasis added). Article 51 sets out the
procedure for resolving these cases which have not reached "friendly settlement." Arti-
cle 51 states:
1. If, within a period of three months from the date of the transmittal of the
report of the Commission to the states concerned, the matter has not either
been settled or submitted ... to the Court [(the IA)] ... the Commission may
... set forth its opinion and conclusions ....
2. Where appropriate, the Commission shall make pertinent recommenda-
tions and shall prescribe a period within which the state is to take the measures
that are incumbent upon it to remedy the situation examined.
3. When the prescribed period has expired, the Commission shall decide...
whether the state has taken adequate measures and whether to publish its
report.
American Convention, supra note 86, art. 51 (emphasis added).
174. Telephone Interview with Jos6 Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director, Center for
Justice and International Law ("CEJIL") and counsel for the petitioners (Feb. 4, 1994);
supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
175. Telephone Interview, supra note 174 (relying on Velfisquez Rodriguez); supra
notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
176. Telephone Interview, supra note 174.
177. Id.
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the Commission was not timely under Article 46(l)(b).'" The govern-
ment asserted that internal remedies were still available because the ap-
peal to the Court Martial of the Second Military Tribunal's November
30, 1989 decision was still pending. 179 The government claimed that the
Supreme Court decision of August 24, 1990, declaring the amnesty de-
cree constitutional, rather than a termination of internal remedies as the
petitioners asserted, was merely an interlocutory decree that did not
bind the Court Martial.18 0 In the alternative, presumably, the govern-
ment asserted that the petition was not timely because petitioners had
ified their complaint with the Commission seven months after the Au-
gust 24, 1990 Supreme Court decision.'
Substantively, the government of Chile disputed neither the occur-
rence of the underlying violations (the disappearance of seventy persons)
nor the fact that the amnesty law obstructs judicial investigation. 8 2
178. Id The formal requirements for admissibility are stipulated in Article 46(1) of
the Convention and Article 32 of the Commission's regulations. Article 46(1) lists as
requirements:
a. that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in
accordance with generally recognized principles of international law;
b. that the petition or communication is lodged within a period of six months
from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of
the final judgment ....
American Convention, supra note 86, art. 46(l).
Article 46(2), however, provides exceptions to Article 46(1) when actions of the state
party interfere with effective domestic remedies or conditions of admissibility, rendering
state remedies futile. Article 46(2) states that the provisions of Article 46(l)(a) and
(1)(b) shall not be applicable when:
a. the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process
of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated;
b. the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the rem-
edies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or
c. there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the
aforementioned remedies.
American Convention, supra note 86, art. 46(2).
179. The Court Martial's opinion affirming the application of the amnesty decree was
subsequently released. See Causa Rol. 553-78, Manuel Contrerasy otros, Corte Marcial,
Chile (Jan. 24, 1992); infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
180. Telephone Interview, supra note 174. The government also asserted that the de-
cision of the Court Martial could be appealed, either to the Supreme Court for modifica-
tion or under a 1991 modification of the Military Code allowing for casacidn, a form of
judicial review. Id; see Report, supra note 2, at 865 note f (distinguishing recurso de
casacidn en elfondo, which permits Supreme Court invalidation of lower court decision
solely for reasons regarding the application of the law, from recurso de casacidn en la
forma, which permits invalidation based on incorrect procedure).
181. Telephone Interview, supra note 174. Article 46(l)(b) requires filing with the
Commission within six months of exhaustion of internal remedies. See supra note 178.
If the August 24, 1990 decision represents the exhaustion of internal remedies for pur-
poses of Article 46(1)(a), the complaint would have to have been filed in February 1991.
The government rejected the petitioners' assertion that the Supreme Court's September
28, 1990 rejection of the request for clarification constituted the final decision for pur-
poses of the six month requirement of Article 46(l)(b). Telephone Interview. supra note
174.
182. Telephone Interview, supra note 174.
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Rather, the government denied responsibility for the actions of the mili-
tary dictatorship, claimed that the constitutional plebiscite of 1988 con-
sisted of a popular ratification of the amnesty law, and asserted that the
actions of the democratic government to establish truth and reconcilia-
tion satisfy its international obligations under Article 1(1) of the Ameri-
can Convention.18
3
The government, therefore, asked the Commission to find the petition
inadmissible for lack of timeliness and failure to exhaust remedies.'8 4
Alternatively, assuming a finding of admissibility, the government
sought a finding that the current government of Chile is not responsible
for the violations alleged, and that the work of the National Commission
on Truth and Reconciliation" 5 and (presumably) the National Corpora-
tion on Reparation and Reconciliation 8 6 satisfies Chile's obligations
under Article 1 of the American Convention.
c. Resolution
The Commission should resolve the procedural assertions of the Chil-
ean government in favor of the petitioners.
On October 2, 1992, the Commission issued reports on cases involving
amnesty provisions from Uruguay" 7 and Argentina.'8 In each of the
cases, the respective state asserted claims of inadmissibility similar to the
assertions of the Chilean government in the current petition.8 9 And in
each case, the Commission rejected the state's contentions.' 9 0
With regard to exhaustion of internal remedies, in particular, the
Commission found that because the amnesty provisions in each nation
had been held constitutional, continuation of judicial proceedings was
futile.19' Since the Chilean Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.; see infra note 270 and accompanying text.
186. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
187. See Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, and 10.375,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993) (Uruguay).
188. See Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, and 10.311, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
41, OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993) (Argentina).
189. The Argentine government asserted that the petition was untimely and that the
violations alleged occurred years before Argentina ratified the American Convention.
See id. 1 7, 9-13. The Uruguayan government asserted that internal remedies were not
exhausted and that the amnesty provision did not violate the American Convention be-
cause it was ratified in a popular referendum. See Uruguay Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
154, 11 (1993).
190. See Uruguay Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, 11 15-16 (1993); Argentina Cases,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 11 10, 19 (1993).
191. See Uruguay Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, 77 15-16 (1993) ("[O]nce the law was
declared constitutional, its effect was to prevent continuation of the proceedings under-
way in the courts of the land.... Therefore, the petitions cannot be considered inadmis-
sible on the ground of a failure to exhaust the remedies under domestic law.");
Argentina Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 11 10, 19 (1993) ("There are no suitable and
effective domestic remedies to nullify the measures being challenged, since the Argentine
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constitutionality of Decree Law No. 2191, the Commission should find
that domestic remedies have been exhausted.
Moreover, on January 24, 1992, the Court Martial of Chile issued a
decision affirming the original November 30, 1989 decision of the Sec-
ond Military Tribunal that first applied the amnesty law to the cases of
disappearance involved in the current petition. 92 The Court Martial
explicitly based its ruling on the Supreme Court's August 24, 1990 deci-
sion upholding the constitutionality of the amnesty law.' 93 Given this
ruling, as well as the Supreme Court's rejection of the request for clarifi-
cation of September 28, 1990 and the Commission's above mentioned
decisions concerning the admissibility of the Argentine and Uruguayan
petitions, the Commission should find that petitioners have exhausted
internal remedies. 194
The Commission should also resolve the substantive issues in the com-
plaint in the petitioners' favor.
In the Argentine and Uruguayan cases, the domestic courts had inter-
preted their respective amnesty provisions as precluding investigations
and prosecutions of violations committed by agents of the states' prior
military regimes. 19s The Commission, thereafter, found that the effects
of these provisions were incompatible with the states' obligations under
the American Convention, as developed in the Velisquez Rodriguez de-
cision, because they effectively denied fair hearings, judicial recourse,
and remedy. 196 The Commission therefore recommended compensation
on the claims of denial of justice.197 Based on the similar effects of
Chile's amnesty decree, these Uruguayan and Argentine cases suggest
Supreme Court has dismissed those cases submitted to it that had argued that the instru-
ments were unconstitutional.").
192. See Causa Rol. 553-78, Manuel Contrerasy otros, Corte Marcial, Chile (Jan. 24,
1992).
193. See id.
194. With regard to the issue of timeliness, the Commission should recognize the peti-
tioners' reliance on the September 28, 1990 decision of the Supreme Court (regarding the
request for clarification) as the date of the exhaustion of domestic remedies. To do
otherwise would privilege the government's alternative pleading and penalize petitioners'
good faith efforts to follow internal legal procedures.
195. While not technically "amnesty laws," these provisions have largely the same
effect as Chile's Decree Law No. 2191. See Cases 10. 147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309,
and 10.311, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 1-5, OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993)
(Argentina) (discussing effects and provisions of the Punto Final [Full Stop Law], Law
No. 23,492 (Dec. 24, 1986), the Due Obedience Law, Law No. 23,521 (June 8, 1987),
and the Presidential Decree of Pardon No. 1002 (Oct. 7, 1989)); Cases 10.029, 10.036,
10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, and 10.375, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, ¢l 2-7,
OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993) (Uruguay) (discussing effects and provi-
sions of the Ley de Caducidad de Ia Pretensi6n Punitiva del Estado [Expiration of Crimi-
nal Complaints Law], Law No. 15,848 (Dec. 22, 1986)).
196. See Argentina Cases, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 52 (1993); Uruguay Cases, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 154, 54 (1993).
197. See ia; supra notes 143 (distinguishing the present-time claim of denial of justice
from claims based on past violations of substantive rights), 149-59 and accompanying
text.
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that the Commission should find Chile's Decree Law No. 2191 incom-
patible with that nation's obligations under the American Convention.
In addition, in response to earlier Commission cases, the governments
of Argentina and Uruguay had submitted to the IAC a request for an
advisory opinion.198 The request sought the IAC's interpretation of sev-
eral articles of the American Convention as they related to the situations
in the earlier cases and in the October 2, 1992 reports.' 99 Specifically,
with regard to the Commission's findings that the Argentine and Uru-
guayan amnesty provisions were incompatible with the American Con-
vention, the request raised the following question:
As regards Articles 41 and 42, the Court is hereby requested to render
an opinion as to whether, in order to justify its dealing with a case
involving communications alleging the violation of the rights pro-
tected by Articles 23, 24 and 25 of the Convention, the Commission is
competent to assess and offer an opinion on the legality of domestic
legislation adopted pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, inso-
far as the "reasonableness," "advisability," or "authenticity" of such
legislation is concerned. 2 °
The IAC ruled in the affirmative: the Commission is competent to
rule "that a norm of internal law violates the Convention."o' The IAC
noted that the manner in which a state violates an international treaty
and, specifically, the American Convention-whether by failure to enact
measures giving domestic effect to the American Convention or by af-
firmative promulgation of contrary provisions2 2-makes no difference
for the purpose of determining the power of the Commission to express
198. See Request for Advisory Opinion OC-13 (Argentina & Uruguay), Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (1992), app. II, at 53-54, OEA/ser. L./V./III.27, doc. 10 (1993).
199. The request sought interpretations of Articles 41 (functions of the Commission),
42 (annual reporting), 44 (standing of nongovernmental agencies, groups and persons),
46 (admissibility of petitions), 47 (inadmissibility), 50 (drafting and transmission of pre-
liminary report without friendly settlement) and 51 (drafting, transmission and publica-
tion of final report) as those articles relate to the situation and circumstances expressed
in the request, and in the concrete cases that the Commission had already addressed.
See id. (citing as examples Cases No. 9768, No. 9780, No. 9828, No. 9850, and No.
9893).
200. Id. at 53 (emphasis added). The request included two additional questions. It
asked whether it was proper for the Commission, with respect to Articles 46 and 47, to
address the merits of a communication pursuant to Article 44 after having declared the
application inadmissible. See id. It also asked whether the Commission could publish a
report under Article 50 before the time specified in Article 51 has expired. See id. The
Court answered these questions in the negative. See Certain Attributes of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (Arts. 41, 42, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Advisory Opinion OC-13/93),
57, July 16, 1993.
201. Certain Attributes, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Advisory Opinion OC-13/93), 37.
202. See id. 26. The IAC noted that a state may violate the Convention "by failing
to establish the norms required by Article 2. Likewise, it may adopt provisions which do
not conform to its obligations under the Convention. Whether those norms have been
adopted in conformity with the internal juridical order makes no difference for these
purposes." Id.
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itself on matters of alleged violations.2"' Domestic laws or other provi-
sions, therefore, including amnesty provisions, are not shielded from the
Commission's scrutiny simply because a state has passed the provisions
in accordance with its internal constitutional norms.2" Indeed, the IAC
specifically acknowledged that states had promulgated such laws and
that the Commission nevertheless could find them incompatible with the
states' obligations under the American Convention.20 Following the
advisory opinion, therefore, the Commission is authorized to find Chile's
amnesty decree incompatible with the American Convention.
The Commission should, therefore, produce findings that Chile's De-
cree Law No. 2191 is incompatible with the Commission's reports and
the IAC's holding in the Vel6squez Rodriguez case. This result seems
even more likely after the IAC's advisory opinion explicitly recognizing
the Commission's authority to pronounce a state's internal norm incom-
patible with the rights protected by the American Convention.
Specifically, the Commission should find that under Articles 1(1), 8,
and 25 of the American Convention, Chile must permit investigative ef-
forts of a judicial nature, and should recommend that Chile advance
prosecutions, wherever possible. Where such investigations and prose-
cutions are not permitted, such that civil remedies against state agents or
the state itself are foreclosed, the Commission should recommend com-
pensation for claims based on the denial of justice. Given the limited
enforcement power of the Commission 0 6 and the good-faith efforts of
Chile's transition government,2 °0 however, it remains to be seen to what
extent the Commission will confront the government of Chile on the
issues of post-conviction punishment or the outright elimination of the
amnesty law.208
203. See ia 27 ("The powers of the Commission in this sense are not restricted in
any way by the means by which the Convention is violated.").
204. See ih 27-28. The IAC distinguished, however, the Commission's authority
to determine the compatibility of an internal norm with a state's obligations under the
Convention from a state's authority "to decide whether the norm contradicts the inter-
nal juridical order of that State." Id. 37, 57(1). With respect to Chile's Decree Law
No. 2191, therefore, the Commission has the authority to declare the law incompatible
with Chile's obligations under the American Convention, but the Commission lacks the
authority to declare the law in contravention of Chile's constitution.
205. See id. 28. The language of the opinion may even be read as implicitly address-
ing grants of amnesty for violations by a prior regime. See id. ("There are historical
situations in which states have promulgated laws which conformed with their juridical
order, but which did not offer adequate guarantees for the exercise of human rights,
imposed unacceptable restrictions or, simply, ignored them.") (emphasis added).
206. See M~ndez & Vivanco, supra note 131, at 523-25 (listing the powers of the Com-
mission); Shelton, supra note 131, at 334-36 (same). Essentially, if the Commission can-
not facilitate a "friendly settlement" under Article 49 it can submit the petition to the
Court (if jurisdiction is accepted), publish its findings and recommendations, or submit
its findings and recommendations to the General Assembly of the OAS. See supra note
173.
207. For discussion of the efforts of the Aylwin administration, see infra notes 270-95
and accompanying text.
208. For a general history of Chile's response to OAS reports on the human rights
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III. ESCAPING THE OBLIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The International Covenant and the American Convention generally
require Chile to provide hearings and effective judicial remedies, even
for violations occurring in the past. The Commission is likely to find
Chile's Decree Law No. 2191 explicitly incompatible with the govern-
ment's obligations under Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention.
Therefore, unless Chile can legally escape from these treaty obligations,
it must either eliminate the amnesty decree or demonstrate alternative
means of compliance that are acceptable under international standards.
The commendable efforts of Chile's transition government have been, to
date, insufficient to satisfy such standards, although these efforts do offer
hope that the new administration will continue to develop an acceptable
program that may eventually be a model for other nations.
A. Methods of Escape
While ultimately it cannot escape its treaty obligations by means of
derogation, Chile may be able, with some change to the current interpre-
tation of the amnesty law, to mitigate its lack of full compliance with
them.
1. Derogation
Derogation is a means for a state to temporarily relieve itself from
some or all of its obligations under a particular law or treaty.20 9 Some
obligations, however, are nonderogable. 210 These include crimes against
humanity and prohibitions on violations of physical integrity-including
disappearance, torture, and execution.21' Some treaties also explicitly
situation under the military government, see Cecilia M. Quiroga, The Battle of Human
Rights: Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System 261-313 (1988).
209. Derogation is defined as the "partial repeal or abolishing of a law, as by a subse-
quent act which limits its scope or impairs its utility and force." Black's Law Dictionary
444 (6th ed. 1990). Derogation is similar to the justification of necessity, in that deroga-
tion relieves states of their obligations under a written law, whereas necessity relieves
obligations of customary law.
A state invoking necessity must show the presence of a grave and imminent risk, that
the state did not contribute to the risk, that no less offensive means are available, and
that the state is not bound by any conflicting treaty obligations. See Roht-Arriaza, supra
note 98, at 505.
A state cannot claim necessity to escape the obligations of a treaty into which it volun-
tarily entered, nor to escape an obligation involving the protection, including investiga-
tion and prosecution, of peremptory norms. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2609.
Necessity, therefore, is not available because Chile is bound by its obligations under
the American Convention and the International Covenant. See supra notes 145-59 and
accompanying text.
210. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2607; Symposium, Transitions to Democracy
and the Rule of Law, 5 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 965, 1052-53 (1990) (remarks of Diane
Orentlicher); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 98, at 485-88.
211. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2607.
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prohibit derogation.212 Whether derivative obligations to investigate, to
prosecute, or to provide effective remedies for violations of nonderogable
rights are themselves nonderogable is undetermined. 13
The American Convention may provide the most compelling evidence
that derivative obligations are nonderogable when the underlying viola-
tions involve nonderogable rights.2"4 Article 27(2) states that the Con-
vention "does not authorize any suspension of the [enumerated] articles
...or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such
rights.' '21 5 Interpreting this provision, the IAC concluded that the right
to seek habeas corpus cannot be suspended because it is necessary to
ensure protection of the nonderogable rights to life, liberty and freedom
from torture or forced disappearance.21 6 Arguably, this rationale would
make all derivative rights nonderogable where the underlying violation
involved grave harms. States would be obligated to investigate, to prose-
cute, and perhaps to provide compensation in all such cases.
Alternatively, derivative obligations to investigate, to prosecute, and
to provide a remedy could be considered derogable because, unlike
habeas corpus, derivative rights serve a primarily deterrent function and
cannot, in a given case, prevent violation of the underlying norm."t 7
Strict requirements on when a state may derogate derivative rights are
then required to ensure that only bona fide claims are excepted.718 Both
the International Covenant and the American Convention provide ex-
amples of such requirements for permissible derogations. 219 Article 27
of the American Convention and Article 4(1) of the International Cove-
nant, for example, discuss the public emergency exception, the most
common ground for derogation. 20
Derogation based on public emergency requires a showing of immi-
212. See American Convention, supra note 86, art. 27(2) (certain substantive rights
are nonderogable); Torture Convention, supra note 96, art. 2(2)-(3).
213. Compare Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2607 (arguing that derivative obligation
may be derogable even when the underlying violations are not) with Roht-Arriaza, supra
note 98, at 487 (arguing that in order to protect effectively underlying nonderogable
rights, derivative obligations must also be nonderogable).
214. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2607.
215. American Convention, supra note 86, art. 27 (emphasis added). Suspension of
the following provisions is not authorized: Article 3 (judicial personality), Article 4
(life), Article 5 (humane treatment), Article 6 (slavery), Article 9 (ex post facto laws),
Article 12 (religion), Article 17 (family), Article 18 (right to a name), Article 19 (rights
of the child), Article 20 (nationality), and Article 23 (participation in government). See
id.
216. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2607-08 (citing Judicial Guarantees in States of
Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8, American Convention on Hum. Rts.), Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Advisory Opinion OC-9/87), O.A.S. Doc. (Ser. A) No.9 (1987)).
217. See id at 2608.
218. See id at 2606-12.
219. See Inter-American Comm'n on Hum. Rts., supra note 37, 'rr 93-97 (discussing
requirements and exigencies of state limits on exercise of internationally recognized
rights and freedoms); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 98, at 485.
220. See American Convention, supra note 86, art. 27(1); International Covenant.
supra note 121, arts. 4(1); Hernin Montealegre, The Compatibility of a State Party's
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nence and gravity,22' and usually requires states to report to other party
states when invoking the exception.2 22 Generally, derogation should be
the only means available of responding to a threat not otherwise caused
by state agents. In principle, this precludes derogation under the public
emergency exception where a prior regime, the military, or other state
agents committed the violations, as in Chile.
In practice, however, states may lack total control over their armed
forces which, although formally organs of the state, substantively pose a
threat to civilian control. 223 Rules governing derogation must take into
account this reality and "provide incentives for governments to assert
control over their armed forces, ' '224 while keeping in mind that "[tlhe
threat of instability is minimized when prosecutions are backed by un-
ambiguous international law whose requirements are confined within
principled limits. '225
In Chile's case, the threat of civil unrest in the past does not merit
derogation from obligations to provide fair hearings or other remedies in
the present. Similarly, any threats of resurgent military intervention to-
day, of the type that accompanied Argentine prosecution efforts, 226 are
neither imminent nor outside the control of the State.227 Chile is, there-
fore, precluded from derogation of its treaty obligations.
Derogation Under Human Rights Conventions with its Obligations Under Protocol I1 and
Common Article 3, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. 41 (1983).
221. See Inter-American Comm'n on Hum. Rts., supra note 37, at 44, 1 93 & 97
(suspension of internationally recognized rights must be "strictly temporary," and lim-
ited to "extremely serious situations"); Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2609.
222. See, e.g., International Covenant, supra note 121, art. 4(3) (state availing itself of
exception "shall immediately inform the other States Parties ... of the provisions from
which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated"); American Con-
vention, supra note 86, art. 27(3) (same effect).
223. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2611; Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 643-45.
224. Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2611.
225. Id. at 2606.
226. For a discussion of the Argentine military's resistance to prosecutions, see Carlos
S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of
Argentina, 100 Yale L.J. 2619, 2627-30 (1991); Rogers, supra note 103, at 265-67; Zala-
quett, supra note 15, at 652-53.
227. With Pinochet remaining Commander-in-Chief, possibly until March 1997, rela-
tions between the military and the civilian government remain uncomfortable, marked
by repeated incidents of military sabre-rattling and rhetorical posturing. For example, in
addition to General Pinochet's statement about the end of the rule of law, supra note *,
General Fernando Matthei said, "If they are going to put [the military] in the pillory, as
in Argentina, that will bring the gravest consequences." Americas Watch, supra note
21, at 48 (citing interview in El Mercurio, July 30, 1989). More recently, on May 28,
1993, while President Aylwin was on an official tour of several European nations, heavily
armed troops in full combat gear appeared in the capital. Ostensibly guarding the head-
quarters of the armed forces during a meeting between Pinochet and the top generals-
who also wore combat uniforms-such displays of force are taken as reminders of the
military's displeasure with continued examination of military personnel involvement in
past violations of human rights. See Long, supra note 22, at A13 (describing the
"Boinazo" of May 28, in reference to the soldiers boinas (berets)); Nathaniel C. Nash,
Coup Anniversary is Marked in Chile, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1993, § 1, at 9; David Pill-
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2. Mitigation
Although Chile cannot outright escape its treaty obligations by dero-
gation, it may be able to mitigate its noncompliance.2 8
Obligations to investigate, to prosecute, and to provide hearings and
remedies serve a deterrent function by shifting the burden of proof to the
state.22 9 It follows, therefore, that once a state has assumed this burden,
and thereby acknowledged to the international community and to the
individual victims its responsibility for past violations, the deterrent
function is largely served. Subsequent extraordinary efforts at full com-
pliance might then be unnecessary. 230
In that event, however, international law must still hold states ac-
knowledging responsibility for past violations to a standard of conduct
sufficient to deter future breaches or omissions. One commentator has
suggested a due diligence standard consisting of the reasonable measures
of prevention, deterrence, and apprehension of those responsible "that a
well-administered government could be expected to exercise under simi-
lar circumstances. '' 231 Others have suggested programs of compliance
tailored to the events in each nation but grounded in basic principles of
law and justice.232
Chilean scholar Jos6 Zalaquett233 suggests a standard based on three
ing, No Easing of General's Grip in 'Free' Chile." The Coming 20th Anniversary of Pi-
nochet's Coup, Fin. Times, Sept. 7, 1993, at 4.
Despite these unsettling actions by the military-which is nevertheless an agent of the
State for purposes of derogation-there is little concern that the military would attempt
another coup. See Long, supra note 22, at A13 (quoting retired colonel and former
Pinochet minister Cristian Labbe saying "[t]here is no possibility of a coup"); Nash,
supra ("no one fears military intervention").
228. Mitigation is defined as "to make less severe. Alleviation, reduction, abatement
or diminution of a penalty or punishment imposed by law." Black's Law Dictionary
1002 (6th ed. 1990).
229. See Jaime Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma of
Transitional Democratic Governments, in State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon: Papers
and Report of the Conference 71, 79, 82 (1988); Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2600
("deterrence rationale"); Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 628; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 98,
at 506-08 (burden shifting).
230. See, e.g., Malamud-Goti, supra note 229, at 83 ("[Ilt is reasonable to expect that
indictments and convictions will begin to have a decreasing deterrent effect after trying a
number of cases.").
231. Shelton, supra note 136, at 23.
232. See Malamud-Goti, supra note 229, at 76 (recognizing moral imperative of bring-
ing violators to trial ("even at the expense of exposing democracy to the risk of a military
rebellion") while permitting limitations of those trials ("fail[ure] to punish all violators
... does not constitute a breech [sic] of moral duties")); Orentlicher, supra note 63, at
2598 (discussing limits to prosecutions); Symposium, supra note 210, at 1048 ("[S]tates
cannot unilaterally relieve themselves of international legal obligations. There may, nev-
ertheless, be room for discussion as to the rigor of application of the rule requiring prose-
cutions in cases of amnesties that genuinely reflect a national will .... ") (remarks of
Nigel Rodley, former head of the Legal and Intergovernmental Organizations Office,
Amnesty International, London).
233. Mr. Zalaquett was an Aylwin appointee to the National Commission on Truth
and Reconciliation. See infra note 270. He was a founder and head of the Human
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conditions: official publication of the truth of the events of the past,
popular ratification, and consistency with international law.234 Once
these conditions of legitimacy are met, he argues, a state should have
discretion to decide how to implement its policy.235 But even this dis-
cretion must be exercised within practical, political, and legal limits.2 36
Practically, a state's ability to mitigate its burden of compliance is
limited by temporal and financial considerations. 237 Particularly where
large numbers of violations occurred, a state's ability to investigate and
to prosecute may be constrained by time, cost, and the ability of the
state's legal system to absorb rapidly large numbers of complaints.238 In
Argentina for example, where nearly 9000 cases of grave violations were
officially documented, courts were inundated with complaints prior to
implementing filing limits embodied in the Full Stop Law.23 9 In nations
like Guatemala, where over 40,000 persons are believed to have disap-
peared, or El Salvador and Nicaragua, where an additional 100,000 per-
sons died,2' the sheer volume of cases could have unintended negative
effects on the judicial system.
International law must therefore permit states to develop standards
for limiting prosecutions. Such standards should keep in mind the di-
minishing deterrent value of successive prosecutions, degrees of culpabil-
ity, including a rejection of the "following orders" defense, and the need
to avoid scapegoating. 241
Along with allowing limits to prosecution, international standards
must recognize a state's discretion in the timing of prosecutions and
other forms of compliance. Most analysts believe that a prosecution
must happen quickly, before the new regime is distracted by the de-
mands of governing and before the displaced powers have had a chance
to close ranks.242 Chile, however, appears to be experimenting with the
Rights Department of the Committee for Peace in Chile (subsequently the Vicarb de
Solidaridad) and former Executive Committee Chair of Amnesty International. Under
the Junta, he was "imprisoned twice without charges and then expelled from Chile
(1975-76)." Introduction, 13 Hamline L. Rev. 463 (1990).
234. See Zalaquett, supra note 65, at 1430-31 (listing truth and ratification as condi-
tions of legitimacy, and international law as limit on state discretion in implementation);
Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 629-33.
235. See Zalaquett, supra note 65, at 1431; Zalaquett, supra note 15 at 628, 633.
236. See Zalaquett, supra note 65, at 1428, 1430-3 1; Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 638,
642.
237. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2596-99; Zalaquett, supra note 24, at 17 (eco-
nomic constraints of Alfonsin regime in Argentina).
238. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2596; Symposium, supra note 210, at 1054-55
(remarks of Diane Orentlicher).
239. See Alejandro M. Garro & Henry Dahl, Legal Accountability for Human Rights
Violations in Argentina: One Step Forward and Two Steps Backward, 8 Hum. Rts. L.J.
283, 334-36 (1987); Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2596; Rogers, supra note 103, at 265-
66.
240. See Moore, supra note 16, at 734.
241. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2598-2603; Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 641-42.
242. See Alice H. Henkin, Conference Report, in State Crimes: Punishment or Par-
don: Papers and Report of the Conference 1, 7 (1988) (citing conference participants'
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opposite course.
The Aylwin administration rejected the idea of immediate prosecution
by special tribunals,2 43 and repeatedly proclaimed that the Executive
supported the use of normal judicial processes for complaints against
agents of the prior regime. 2" At the same time, by creating the Na-
tional Commission on Truth and Reconciliation2 4 early in the term, the
administration forestalled divisive discussion of human rights while it
gained crucial stability.2'4 Even as it released the Commission Report,
the administration maintained its position in support of normal (time-
consuming) avenues of judicial investigation.2 47 But it also reempha-
sized its position that courts should not apply the amnesty law broadly,
emphasis on "acting expeditiously in investigating charges and bringing the violators to
trial to take advantage of initial elan and fresh memories"). In Argentina, for example,
the ultimate failure of the prosecutions of military officers is credited to delays in actions
by military courts. See Nino, supra note 226, at 2627 (delays in prosecutions led to
unrest in the military); Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 654 ("momentum was lost when a
fruitless investigation dragged on for months"). Similarly, the passage of time before a
plebiscite on the issue of granting amnesty in Uruguay is credited with assisting the
measure's passage. See Correa, supra note 48, at 1457, 1463 ("The Uruguayan experi-
ence taught many Chileans to do quickly whatever had to be done.").
243. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 75, at 137-39 (quoting Aylwin's inaugural
promise to "cooperate with the courts to the extent possible"); Ayhwin Rechaza un 'Nu-
remberg Chileno'[Aylwin Rejects a Chilean Nuremberg], La Naci6n, July 30, 1990 at 3.
244. See Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 50. In this regard, the program of
Aylwin's governing coalition stated:
[T1he democratic Government will put forth its best efforts in order to estab-
lish the truth... [and to] procure the trial according to the actual penal law, of
the human rights violations that represent atrocious crimes against life, liberty
and personal integrity...
Cases are to be tried in civilian courts, which should act in accordance with
the principle of due process of law, and with full respect of the procedural
guarantees of victims and those held responsible.
Patricio Aylwin, Programa de Gobierno: Concertaci6n de Partidos Por la Democracia 2
(1989) (copy on file with the Fordham Law Review); see also Correa, supra note 48, at
1460 (translation). Upon taking office, Aylwin reiterated the position:
[B]ringing someone to trial for an alleged criminal act is the role of the courts
of justice. My Government is firmly resolved to cooperate with the courts to
the extent possible to enable them to fully play their role in determining indi-
vidual responsibility in every case that has or will come before them.
Inter-Am. C.H.R, supra note 75, at 138.
245. See infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Commission and
its report).
246. See Correa, supra note 48, at 1483. This Note does not suggest that the adminis-
tration intended to extend the time-frame for addressing the violations of the past, as
much as it intended to forestall divisive discussions of those violations, perhaps indefi-
nitely. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 75, at 138 ("[D]elays in clarifying the truth
disrupt community life and conspire against the desires of Chileans for peaceful
reconciliation.").
247. On March 4, 1991, in a nationally broadcast speech to the nation presenting the
findings of the Commission, President Aylwin stated:
Today, I have sent the Supreme Court a message to which I have attached
the text of the Report and I ask that ... they instruct the relevant courts to
activate with greatest expediency the cases which are pending on human rights
1994]
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especially not to obstruct investigations prior to the identification of vic-
tims and the location of physical remains.248
This policy favoring normal judicial processes-which helps to pre-
vent a permanent impunity pending final resolution of cases-has ex-
tended the time-frame in which to address violations by the military
regime. In so doing, it has enabled the democratic government to revisit
repeatedly the issues of the amnesty decree and proseoutions without
risking direct confrontation with the military.249 Spurred on by the me-
dia, nongovernmental groups, and sections of the populace, the demo-
cratic government has been required to respond, for example, to
discoveries of mass graves,250 to dramatic turns of events in high profile
violations and those which must be heard as a result of the information that the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission has forwarded to them ...."
Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 51 (translation, full text of speech reprinted in El
Mercurio, Mar. 5, 1991).
248. Discussing its position on the amnesty law, the governing coalition's campaign
program stated:
Due to its very legal nature and true meaning, the amnesty decree-law of
1978 has not and cannot become an impediment for the disclosure of the truth,
the investigation of the facts and the establishment of criminal responsibilities
in cases of crimes against human rights .... The democratic government will
continue the program to promote the derogation or nullification of the Am-
nesty Law.
Aylwin, supra note 244, at 3; Correa, supra note 48, at 1461 (translation). Note that the
coalition did not promise to repeal the amnesty law, "but to make efforts to achieve that
result." Correa, supra note 48, at 1461.
Upon presenting the findings of the Commission to the Supreme Court, Aylwin in-
formed the Court that "in [Aylwin's] view, the amnesty in force, which the Government
respects, cannot be an obstacle to the realization of a judicial investigation and the deter-
mination of responsibilities, especially in the cases of disappeared persons." Americas
Watch, supra note 21, at 51 (translation from text of speech, reprinted in El Mercurio,
Mar. 5, 1991) (footnote omitted).
249. The government has actually worked to restore the traditional respect for the
armed forces, while marginalizing individuals and groups within those forces-perhaps
intentionally setting the stage for future prosecutions. The Commission's findings reflect
the government's dual tone:
[T]he fundamental role played by the armed forces and security forces in the
history of the country should be fully appreciated, as should be their character
as permanent and essential national institutions. Finally, it is praiseworthy to
strive to avoid any use of the issue of human rights to attempt to sully these
institutions, or to detract from their contribution to the country and the role
they are called to play in the future.
Nevertheless, these points cannot be invoked to deny the historic and moral
responsibility that may befall one institution or another as a result of the prac-
tices it ordered, or to which it consented, or with regard to which it failed to do
all that was required to impede or prevent their recurrence .... The armed
forces and the security forces are no exception. It is human beings who forge
and make institutions great, and it is also human beings who can affect them
negatively.
Report, supra note 2, at 34-35.
250. In March 1990, only two weeks after the start of Aylwin's term, the remains of
three victims of the military regime were found in Colina. In early June 1990, 19 bodies
were found preserved-some still wearing blindfolds-in the desert soil near Pisagua. In
all, nearly 20 clandestine graves were opened during 1990. See Americas Watch, supra
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cases, 25' and to revelations by former Pinochet agents about past
crimes.252 Since such discoveries and revelations result from the covert
nature of the violations committed by the military regime, Chile and
other nations emerging from periods of repression might reasonably ex-
pect a stream of such events to provide repeated opportunities to further
press opposition to the impunity.253
note 21, at 13-16. Discovery and identification of other remains continue. See. e.g.,
Amnesty International, 1993 Ann. Rep. 93 (identification of 127 bodies exhumed in
1991 continues).
The media coverage and public outcry following the discoveries, especially Pisagua,
increased pressure on the democratic administration to address the violations of the past,
as well as on the military to accept some action by the new government. At the same
time, the military continued its rhetorical posturing, releasing statements that the vic-
tims of Pisagua, for example, were legitimate casualties of war and that the people
should "be careful" not to seek too much truth about the past. See Americas Watch,
supra note 21, at 16 n.23.
251. Some of the more famous cases include the Degollados, the Quemados, the
Desaparecidos, and the Letelier case.
The Degollados (ones with slit throats) case involves the 1985 abduction, torture and
murder of three Communist Party members whose bodies were found outside Santiago
with their throats slit. See Zabel et al., supra note 36, at 448-54. The Quemados (burned
ones) case involves the brutal burnings of two youths, one fatally, in 1986. See id. at
441-48. The Desaparecidos (disappeared ones) case or the "Cerda" case is a consolida-
tion of missing persons cases that resulted in an indictment from Judge Carlos Cerda of
some 40 persons-of whom 38 were military or police agents. See id. at 454-56. A
Santiago Appeals Court subsequently barred the indictments under the amnesty law.
See Inter-American Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 1987 Y.B. on Hum. Rts. 376-80 (1987).
The Letelier case, involving the assassination of the former Chilean foreign minister in
Washington, is the only case specifically exempted from the amnesty law and the only
one in which prosecutions for past violations of human rights have been won. See supra
notes 6 & 47.
252. Former DINA officer Osvaldo Romo Mena was found hiding in Brazil, arrested
and returned to Chile in 1992, sparking a flurry of media coverage and re-examination of
the amnesty law. See Los Efectos Poh~icos Del Caso Romo: Todo de Nue'o [The Political
Effects of the Romo Case: Everything is New], Hoy, Aug. 17-23, 1992, at 6-10; Francisco
Martorell, Bienvenido Seffor Romo (I): El Factor Inesperado [Welcome Mr. Romo: The
Unforeseen Factor], Anfilisis, Aug. 17-30, 1992, at 8-14; Felipe Pozo, Los Fantasmas
Revividos [The Ghosts Come Back to Life], id. at 5; Domingo Namuncura Serrano,
Romo: Signo de Dolor y Vergi'enza [Romo: Symbol of Pain and Disgrace], id. at 22-23.
Romo may be implicated in over 100 disappearances. The most visible of these, the
Chanfreau-Romo case, has led already to the first interrogation by a civil judge, Gloria
Olivares, of a serving army officer, Colonel Miguel Krasnoff Marchenko, Romo's former
commander. See Coad, supra 75, at 11.
Romo is not the only former agent to come forward. Two other former Pinochet
collaborators, Alejandra Merino and Luz Arce have also recently given evidence to
courts. See id. Moreover, Romo, Merino, and Arce are only three of many DINA
fugitives and collaborators who, like the Nazis before them, are likely to continue being
discovered for many years, providing a stream of opportunities to challenge the amnesty
law and to slowly dismantle its effect. But see Garro & Dahl, supra note 239, at 344
(commenting with irony on the relative ease of prosecuting Nazi criminals in Argentina
for violations decades earlier as opposed to the impunity for active-duty Argentine of-
ficers for violations of the last twenty years).
253. See, e.g., Zalaquett, supra note 65, at 1431 ("[P]olitical situations are far from
static, and if the new government consistently follows the best possible approach, despite
being limited by the circumstances it faces, new possibilities may open up along the
way.").
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Unlike practical limits on time and resources, however, political capi-
tal254 should not be considered a limited resource for purposes of mitiga-
tion.255 It is too difficult to measure, easily misrepresented, and has
minor bearing on legal obligations.25 6 Understandably, the predominant
interest of all transition governments is to maintain political stability
and civilian rule. And despite the arguments to the contrary, 25 7 new
governments believe that investigation of past crimes and prosecution of
those responsible, especially military agents, is destabilizing.258 Interna-
tional standards for mitigation should recognize these concerns, but not
from a political perspective.259
One alternative might be to recognize states' concerns for domestic
stability by considering the nation's economic stability. 2 ° Unlike polit-
ical capital, economic conditions can be objectively quantified and inde-
pendently verified. Military interventions, moreover, have often been
linked to economic disorder, as in both Argentina and Chile.261 But any
254. For the purposes of this Note, political capital is the leverage or good will neces-
sary to effect programs addressing past violations of human rights. The democratic gov-
ernment is most limited politically by dependence on the cooperation of conservative
members of the Senate. As part of the transition, nine of the 46 Senate seats were ap-
pointed under Pinochet to ensure a conservative majority capable of blocking attempts
to amend the constitution (which requires a two thirds vote of both the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate). See Correa, supra note 48, at 1462. Also under the terms of
the transition, each former president automatically becomes a member of the Senate.
See Americas Watch, supra note 23, at 45. In the December 1993 elections, president-
elect Frei's coalition of parties (the Concertacidn) gained a 70-50 majority in the House
of Deputies, but only 22 of 47 seats in the Senate. See Frei Meets With Pinochet, Military
High Command, supra note 50.
Nevertheless, the democratic administration's inability to secure passage of specific
legislation--due to obstruction from other elements of the State-does not relieve Chile
of its obligations under international law.
255. See Symposium, supra note 210, at 1054 ("that prosecution... may be politically
inexpedient is no excuse for a state's failure to discharge its obligations under interna-
tional law") (remarks of Diane Orentlicher, then Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School);
Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 642-45; Moore, supra note 16, at 734-38 (arguing against
using grants of amnesty as political bargaining chips).
256. See Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 642-45.
257. See Malamud-Goti, supra note 229, at 79 (trials "tend to consolidate democratic
institutions"); Hernfin Montealegre, The Security of the State and Human Rights," in
Human Rights in the Americas: The Struggle for Consensus 187 (Alfred Hennelly &
John Langan eds., 1982) (arguing that respect for human rights is a component of na-
tional security); Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2606.
258. See Nino, supra note 226, at 2637-39; Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 626, 642-45;
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 98, at 506.
259. But see Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 642-46 (discussing need to account for polit-
ical constraints, including position adopted by political and military forces).
260. See Crahan, supra note 23, at 48 (Factors encouraging or discouraging interven-
tion by the armed forces include "the severity of the political and economic crisis" in the
country.).
261. One commentator, for example, noted with regard to Chile:
[I]t was only after Chile entered into a period of severe political and economic
crisis that civilian acceptance of military intervention grew .... The Chilean
case suggests that relatively strong traditions of democratic participation and
civilian government are not sufficient barriers to military intervention unless
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reliance on economic conditions as a component of mitigation must be
tempered with concern that the standards of measurement employed are
not themselves contrary to the respect for human rights.262
Standards must also allow states to address any residual political con-
cerns through the state's discretionary powers, including the power to
control the timing of compliance 263 and the power to grant pardons,
which are preferable to grants of amnesty because pardons are generally
issued after prosecutions and thereby expose the circumstances of the
violations and the identity of the violators.216
Along with practical and political limitations, standards governing a
state's mitigation should consider the limitations of traditional legal
processes and should recognize varying forms of investigation, punish-
ment, and compensation.265 Official publication of the truth about past
violations, for example, can serve an investigative function. 2 s Publica-
tion of the names of those responsible may serve both investigative and
sanctioning purposes.2 67 Loss of social or professional status or rank,
pensions, or other government benefits may constitute punishment
(although distinct from prosecution).268 Similarly, subsidies, scholar-
ships, and welfare benefits for victims and their survivors may compen-
sate to some degree.2
69
B. Chile's New Model
The Aylwin administration's efforts to address human rights viola-
tions of the past fall to meet its international obligations. The broad
governments have a fair degree of success in mediating competing socioeco-
nomic and political claims within society.
Id. at 60-61.
262. See, eg., Antonio Cassese, Foreign Economic Assistance and Respect for Civil and
Political Rights: Chile-A Case Study, 14 Tex. Int'l I.J. 251, 256-57, 260-63 (1979)
(economic conditions that favor foreign investment may result from increased repression
and socioeconomic inequity).
263. See supra notes 242-53 and accompanying text.
264. See Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 2604. A pardon releases a convicted offender
from punishment. A grant of amnesty erases the offense itself, and with it all official
sanction. See id. at 2604; Rogers, supra note 103, at 304; Goldman, supra note 3. at 3-4;
supra note 3.
265. See Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 635-36.
266. See id at 651-52, 657. It can also support efforts aimed at prevention, compensa-
tion and reconciliation. See Correa, supra note 48, 1474-82.
267. See Zalaquett, supra note 15 at 634-35. Whether the Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation should have published the names of individuals found to have violated
human rights was a publicly discussed issue. Ultimately, concern for due process pro-
hibited such action. See Correa, supra note 48, at 1472; Report, supra note 2, at 42-43;
infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
268. See Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 635-36. In a recent move, for example, the
Chamber of Deputies requested that the Army form a commission to purge itself of
officers implicated in past violations. See Chile: Purging the Military, supra note 6.
While not a substitute for formal prosecution, the request is an indication that opposi-
tion to the impunity persists.
269. See id.; Correa, supra note 48, at 1481-82.
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scope of the amnesty law continues to deny victims and their families
effective investigation and remedies for violations of protected rights. At
the same time, the Administration has taken steps to establish an official
record of the past and to compensate victims. If such measures are con-
tinued under the administration of Eduardo Frei, they may lead to a
dissolution of the impunity that satisfactorily meets the above suggested
standards for mitigating Chile's noncompliance. Chile may then be re-
garded as an acceptable model for other nations.
1. Publication of the Truth
One of President Aylwin's first official acts was to appoint an in-
dependent investigative body called the National Commission on Truth
and Reconciliation (the "Rettig Commission").27 0 The State has as-
serted that the appointment of the Rettig Commission and its subse-
quent report mitigate Chile's obligations by demonstrating
acknowledgement of state responsibility for past violations and by estab-
lishing an official truth about those violations which resulted in death.27'
Supporters of this position praise the Rettig Commission's report for
acknowledging government involvement, memorializing an official truth
as a deterrent to future violations, referring viable cases to the courts,
and recommending the creation of government offices to provide com-
pensation to surviving victims and their families.272
Detractors, in contrast, argue that the eleven-month life-span of the
Rettig Commission was too short, that the mandate covering only cases
which resulted in death was too narrow, and that the Rettig Commis-
sion's extra-judicial nature and refusal to publish names of wrong doers
failed to address the interests of the victims' families and society.273
While the failure to publish names does diminish the report's truth-
serving function, it is understandable from both policy and due process
perspectives.274 More disturbing is the Rettig Commission's inability,
270. See Decree No. 355 (Apr. 25, 1990), published in Diario Oficial (May 9, 1990),
reprinted in Report, supra note 2, at 5-9. The official report of the Rettig Commission,
the Informe de la Comisidn Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliacidn (also known as the
Informe Rettig [Rettig Report]), has recently been translated by the Center for Civil and
Human Rights of the Notre Dame Law School. See id. The Commission is often re-
ferred to as the Rettig Commission after its president, Rafil Rettig Guissen. The other
members were Jaime Castillo Velasco, Jos6 Luis Cea Egafia, M6nica Jim6nez de La Jara,
Ricardo Martin Diaz, Laura Novoa Visquez, Gonzalo Vial Correa, and Jos6 Luis Zala-
quett Daher. See id. at 7; see also Correa, supra note 48, at 1464 (regarding creation of
the Rettig Commission).
271. See Report, supra note 2, passim; Correa, supra note 48, at 1468-7 1.
272. See Correa, supra note 48, at 1466, 1471, 1473, 1481-82.
273. See Correa, supra note 48, at 1473-74 (discussing limits of the Rettig Report).
274. See Report, supra note 2, at 42-43 (explaining decision not to include names in
the report). Were it not for the Chilean Supreme Court's interpretation of the amnesty
law as barring even investigations, formal judicial truth-seeking would likely have re-
sulted in the disclosure of the identities of many violators, and the Commission's with-
holding would be less relevant. See Zalaquett, supra note 65, at 1436 (discussing
Supreme Court interpretation of the amnesty decree).
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because of restrictions in its mandate, to examine any of the thousands
of cases of violations of nonderogable human rights from which the vic-
tims survived-specifically cases involving torture. 75 As previously dis-
cussed, there are no conditions which relieve a state's responsibility to
protect against torture.2 76 Therefore Chile's failure to examine numer-
ous cases of torture under the military government seriously undermines
the claim that the work of the Rettig Commission should mitigate
Chile's noncompliance with its treaty obligations.
2. Reparations
Following the report of the Rettig Commission, the government
passed legislation providing assistance to victims and their families.
Among these, Law No. 19,123 created the National Corporation for
Reparation and Reconciliation. 77 The National Corporation was
charged with continuing to examine cases which the Rettig Commission
left unresolved, with providing medical, educational, and monetary
compensation to victims' families, and with developing educational pro-
grams that will foster a "culture of respect" for human rights in
Chile.278 Supporters point to the National Corporation as a milestone in
human rights protection because the State, of its own initiative, is pro-
viding reparations for victims of a prior regime.2 79
Critics charge, however, that the services and pensions the National
Corporation provides are not fair compensation, as compared to the civil
remedies precluded by the amnesty law and otherwise mandated by
Chile's treaty obligations. Critics also argue that the National Corpora-
tion's mandate is both overbroad in its goals and too limited in its
twenty-four month duration, and that the surviving victims of torture
are again ignored.28°
Whether one views the work of the National Corporation as mitigat-
275. See Correa, supra note 48, at 1473-74. The report does acknowledge the wide-
spread use of torture and examines the incidents of torture which resulted in death.
Thus the primary failing is that the Report, together with the amnesty decree, leaves
survivors of torture without means to identify, and thus bring action against, their tor-
turers. See id.; Report, supra note 2, at 28. Adding insult, many of the reparative meas-
ures recommended by the Commission did not apply to victims of torture because their
cases were not included in the official report. See infra notes 277-81 and accompanying
text.
276. See supra, notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
277. See Law No. 19,123, published in Diario Oficial (Feb. 8. 1992), reprinted in Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Chile, Law Nr. 19,123: Creating the National Cor-
poration for Reparation and Reconciliation (1992) (copy on file with the Fordham Law
Review). The operating regulations were not published in Diario Oficial until July 15,
1992.
278. See Law No. 19.123, published in Diario Oficial (Feb. 8, 1992); see also Louise
Byrne, Chile's Nightmare: Amnesty Law Protects Those Guilty of Past Abuses, Gazette
(Montreal), May 3, 1993, at B3 (discussing unique acts of reparation).
279. Interview with Alejandro Gonzalez, President of the National Corporation, in
Santiago, Chile (Aug. 11, 1992).
280. Id.
19941
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ing Chile's international obligations seems to depend in part on one's
view of compensation as a substitute for prosecution. Some commenta-
tors argue that punishment may not be necessary if the government fully
reports the truth and provides compensation sufficient to restore individ-
uals and society, as far as is possible, to the status quo ante.281 However
valid this view may be, the limited nature of the compensation and the
failure to provide sufficient information for victims to bring civil actions
prevents the work of the National Corporation from fully mitigating
Chile's obligations.
3. Dismantling the Impunity
This Note has asserted that the amnesty law inhibits Chile's ability to
satisfy the suggested standards governing mitigation because it obstructs
investigation. Without investigation, victims are unable to exercise their
rights to fair hearing and judicial remedy under the American Conven-
tion and the International Covenant. Chile should therefore undertake
efforts to dismantle at least some element of the blanket amnesty law. A
number of proposals have already been attempted in Chile, including
several proposals for the total elimination of the amnesty law. Different
implications arise from each, depending on whether they nullify, abro-
gate, or repeal the law.282
Before examining these proposals, however, it should be noted that
many Chileans support the continued validity, and even the possible ex-
pansion, of the amnesty provisions. Among these are persons sympa-
thetic to the protection of human rights, who assert that the amnesty
law is an integral part of the reconciliation of the nation. Their asser-
tions, rather than mere expediency, find their roots in principles of truth
and justice,283 and merit careful consideration as they help to inform
decisions, not only as to whether the protections of the amnesty decree
should be dismantled at all, but also as to the manner and scope of any
efforts in that direction.
One of the more visible efforts to dismantle the amnesty law was a
petition drive begun on August 4, 1992, by the families of victims of past
violations, human rights groups, and politicians.284 Their goal was to
281. See Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 629, 634.
282. Of all the options, nullification is most effective in terms of advancing prosecu-
tions because it runs free of constitutional complications as well as the principle of non-
retroactivity of criminal law. See Zalaquett, supra note 15, at 638-39 (discussing the
choice to nullify, rather than abrogate, the Argentine military's self-amnesty law).
283. See Report, supra note 2, at 886 ("The stand people take concerning justice tends
to determine how they view the notions of impunity and amnesty."). The Rettig Com-
mission reported:
We have encountered divided opinions over what justice entails .... [Some]
believe that given the amount of time that has passed and the manner in which
the events took place and their context, it would not be advisable to open or
reopen trial procedures, since the results could be the opposite of those sought.
Id. at 885-86.
284. See El Comit Organizador de la Campafia Pro-Anulaci6n del Decreto Ley de
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collect one million signatures demanding that the Congress nullify the
amnesty law.285 Such total elimination of the amnesty law, however, is
extremely unlikely, if only because the 1980 constitution requires any
bill modifying the amnesty law to originate in the Senate, which is far
less sensitive to popular sentiment than the Concertacidn-controlled
House of Deputies.286 Total elimination of the amnesty law would,
however, allow Chile to meet its international obligations and thereby
would remove the need for mitigation.
The more likely options for dismantling the blanket coverage of the
amnesty law are two types of restrictive changes. Socialist Party legisla-
tors in Chile called for an interpretive law to clarify that the amnesty
law does not apply to grave violations where life was lost."87 Specifi-
cally, the first article of the proposal would clarify that Articles 1 and 3
of Decree Law No. 2191 must be interpreted consistently with Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 8 This would remove from the
protection of the amnesty law those pending cases involving the most
serious violations of human rights.289 The proposal's second article
would permit reexamination of cases closed under the earlier, broad in-
terpretation of the amnesty decree. 90 In theory, this would open the
judicial process to the niost serious violations of human rights. Critics
of this approach charge that the proposal is not well drafted, and even if
it were, the political distortions remaining from the transition would
prevent passage.291 Similarly-intended proposals were advanced by poli-
ticians Juan Pablo Letelier, Camilo Escalona, Sergio Aguil6, Jaime
Naranjo, Laura Rodriguez, and Mario Devaud,292 and by attorneys Ve-
Amnistia, Invitaci6n (invitation to first event of the campaign) (copy on file with the
Fordham Law Review); see also Paula Chain, Manifestantes Marcharon Contra la Ley de
Amnistia [Demonstrators March Against the Amnesty Law], La Naci6n, Mar. 5, 1992, at
5 (discussing demonstrations organized by the same coalition).
285. See Byrne, supra note 278, at B3. Note that there are approximately six million
eligible voters in Chile.
286. The constitution requires that any motion resulting in a change to the amnesty
decree must originate in the Senate, where nine seats are occupied by Senators desig-
nated under Pinochet. See supra note 254.
287. See Rolando C. Aranguiz et al., Motion to the Senate Concerning an Interpretive
Law (prepared for signature by Senators Rolando Calder6n Aranguiz, Jaime Gazmuri
Mujica, Hernfin Vodanovic Schanke, and Ricardo Nfifiez Mufioz) (unpublished draft on
file with the Fordham Law Review). The bill was first put forward to the legislature in
April of 1992. See Malcolm Coad, Chile Amnesty, Guardian (Manchester), Apr. 9, 1992
at 7.
288. See id.; supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
289. See Aranguiz, supra note 287. Among those that would no longer be protected
are crimes against the life or physical integrity of the individual, including, among
others, all forms of homicide, mutilations, torture, the taking of hostages and summary
executions. See id.
290. See id.
291. See supra notes 254 & 286.
292. See Bancada de Izquierda Impulsard Proyecto para Anular Ley de Amnistib [Left
Bench Will Push Project to Nullify the Amnesty Law], El Mercurio, June 1990.
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r6nica Reyna, Carmen Hertz, and Alfonso Insunza.293
Similar to an interpretive law, a judicial reinterpretation of the am-
nesty decree could remove obstacles to investigation and prosecution,
while perhaps continuing to bar punishment. Given the dramatic
changes in the Chilean political climate and the number of high-profile
cases still pending in the Chilean courts, a reinterpretation is possible,
but the scope and terms of any new holding is difficult to discern. In
recent experience, for example, the Supreme Court has allowed a civil
judge to interrogate an active-duty military officer about past violations
of human rights.2 94 But the Court also denied a claim that the amnesty
decree did not apply to cases interfering with Chile's affairs with another
state.295
In terms of mitigation, any change in either the interpretation or the
application of the amnesty law should at least allow official identification
of the parties responsible, since this might then make civil actions possi-
ble. A reinterpretation that would also allow prosecutions-even with
subsequent pardons guaranteed-would satisfy the suggested standards,
especially when the work of the Rettig Commission and the National
Corporation are also considered.
The most unacceptable option discussed in Chile today is the promul-
gation of new, expanded amnesty laws intended to put to rest discussion
of future prosecutions of military personnel, as well as to resolve the
problem of political prisoners.29 6 But such laws would also foreclose
further investigations, leaving many disappearances unresolved and
Chile's international obligations unmet.
One recent proposal which threatened to have such effect was
presented by the Aylwin administration on August 3, 1993. Responding
to increasing tensions between the civilian government and the mili-
tary,297 the Aylwin administration presented a bill-known as the Ley
293. See Reyna et al., supra note 105, at 31.
294. See supra note 252.
295. See supra note 6. In another recent development, the Supreme Court ruled for
the first time that the country's former secret police force, the DINA, was directly re-
sponsible for the disappearance of at least one person, Maria Joui, during the Pinochet
era. The Court, however, continued to apply the amnesty decree to the case, maintain-
ing a prior denial of the argument that the amnesty decree should not apply to cases of
unresolved disappearance because they constitute on-going kidnappings (and thus are
beyond the 1978 limit of the amnesty law). See, e.g., Chile: Court Makes "Historic"
Ruling on Abuses Under Pinochet, Inter Press Service, Sept. 16, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (describing the DINA's implication in past abuses
but noting the continued application of the amnesty law).
296. See Americas Watch, supra note 21, at 51. Some of these prisoners were arrested
in connection with acts of violence after 1978. Others were arrested before the amnesty
decree was issued but did not benefit because their cases were in process at the time. See
supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Decree Law No.
2191). Because such an expansion would cover left-wing militants as well as former
government agents and nonviolent political prisoners, the proposal has gained little legis-
lative support.
297. See supra note 227.
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Aylwin or Aylwin Law-designed to resolve issues of past violations by
speeding up on-going investigations and by facilitating the discovery of
the truth in unresolved disappearances. The bill proposed that up to
fifteen judges from the Courts of Appeals be assigned full time to investi-
gate human rights cases, that the trials would be conducted in locations
where the secrecy of military testimony could be guaranteed, that appli-
cation of the amnesty law to events between 1973 and 1978 would be
assured, and that military personnel convicted of later crimes would be
held in special locations of confinement. 298
The bill was opposed by both right- and left-wing parties. The Right
objected to the bill's implied interpretation of the 1978 amnesty law that
would allow investigations,299 charging that it had already been estab-
lished that investigations were foreclosed. The Left objected to the bill's
assurance that the 1978 amnesty law would be applied (effectively mak-
ing the impunity permanent) and to the bill's third article guaranteeing
secrecy for military testimony.3"o After the failure of a compromise
amendment on the secrecy issue, parties of the Left removed their sup-
port, forcing the Aylwin administration to withdraw the proposal.3 t
While a political setback for the administration, the Left's defeat of
the Aylwin Law may be a positive indication that Chile is developing a
new model for redressing past violations of human rights: a model
marked by gradual improvements over an extended time-frame. It sug-
gests that, nearly four years into the transition, much of the populace is
still not prepared to surrender the issue of human rights to the impunity
of the amnesty law. It remains for the administration of president-elect
Frei, therefore, to continue to develop this model.3" 2
CONCLUSION
What we will have in Chile is what exists in any civilized country:
Every citizen knows that the state cannot violate his rights with impu-
nity. I have never met an American who thinks that the police can
298. See Ricardo Concha, Chile Rights Cases, L.A. Times, Aug. 21, 1993, at B7 (letter
to the editor from Consul General of Chile); Alexandra Huneeus, Chile Still Divided
Over Rights Trials, S.F. Chron., Sept. 10, 1993, at A14; Nathaniel C. Nash, Chile Re-
fuses to Forget Crimes of Past, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1993, § 4, at 3.
299. See Huneeus, supra note 298, at A18.
300. See Huneeus, supra note 298; Nash, supra note 298.
301. See Huneeus, supra note 298; Nash, supra note 298.
302. President-elect Frei has stated that he does not believe the amnesty law fore-
closes investigations. See Ronnie Lovler, Chilean Military May Stall Chile's Move to
Democracy (CNN Television news broadcast, Dec. 14, 1993) (transcript 4397-4) (via
translator). He has also promised to seek amendment of constitutional provisions in-
volving the military transition. See Frei Meets with Pinochet, supra note 50. Still, the
president-elect's intentions on human rights are uncertain, with at least one commenta-
tor suggesting that Frei is not likely to press for a resolution of the issue. See Forging
Ahead to a Future of Democracy, Business Latin America, Sept. 20, 1993 (quoting Pro-
fessor William C. Smith, Univ. of Miami), available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid
File.
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come and kidnap him at 5 A.M. Until now, Chileans have not man-
aged that. But we are much closer to it now than we were a few years
ago.3 °3
Ultimately, Chile must narrow the amnesty law to permit investiga-
tion and punishment of at least the most severe violations of human
rights committed by the former military regime. Without such narrow-
ing, the work of the democratic government, including the Rettig Com-
mission and the National Corporation, is insufficient to mitigate Chile's
noncompliance with international law. The amnesty law will continue
to deny victims and their survivors their rights to a fair hearing, judicial
protection, and remedy under the American Convention and, by anal-
ogy at least, the International Covenant.
At the same time, the international community should recognize rea-
sonable standards of mitigation that recognize nascent democratic ad-
ministrations' concern for stability. The international community
should recognize as well Chile's, and in particular President Aylwin's,
efforts to meet such standards: efforts marked by official recognition of
abuses, formal reparations, restoration of judicial remedies over an ex-
tended time-frame, and, in due course perhaps, prosecutions. When
coupled with a dismantling of the blanket impunity, these efforts may
lead to an acceptable model for other transition governments: a model
that addresses both stability and compliance with the obligations of law
and justice.
303. Drewifus, supra note 1, at 162 (remarks of Roberto Garreton, Aug. 13, 1990).
The passage continues: "I will know that we have achieved respect for human rights
here when I am positive that no one will violate them. I would like to reach the moment
when Chileans feel that if the doorbell rings at 5 A.M., they will be certain that it is only
the milkman." Id.
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